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Institutional reforms stand a greater chance of succeeding when
there is adequate institutional diagnosis and design, including
assessment of the interest groups affected and the ability of top
leaderstomobilize supportforreform.  A goodcasecanbe made
for bringing the key players together in a process approach to
diagnosis, so that diagnosis becomes an early stage of consensus
building among those who will be affected by the reforms.
The Policy, Planning, and Research  Complex distributes PPR Wotking Papes to disseminate the findings of work in progress and to
encourage the exchange of ideas among Bank  staff and al1  others interested in development issues. These  papers carry the nar es of
the authors, reflect only their views, and should be used and ctued  accordingly.  The fundings, interpretations, and conclusions are the
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Puli  Set  Managemen
and Private  Sector  Development
Institutional reforms in sector adjustment  lize support for reform and to resist opposition.
operations (SECALs) are designed to deal with  Joint diagnostic exercises are likely to yield a
three types of issues: organizational restructur-  better mix of technical, organizational, and
ing and strengthening; regulatory and procedural  political analysis and provide a better basis for
reforms; and the building of sector policy and  assessing the feasibility of implementation.
planning capability. Paul learned in his review
of 55 of the 65 SECALs approved during fiscal  When the issues and causes of problems are
1983-87 that:  unclear, a "process approach" to diagnosis is
called for - and a good case can be made for
Of all the institutional reforms, organiza-  bringing together key players with different
tional restructurings, including divestiture, were  perceptions of the problems or in other ways
the most difficult to implement. In some cases,  using the diagnostir process for early consensus
implementation was delayed by the coordination  building or at least an appreciation of the
problems of the multiplicity of agencies in-  different perceptions involved. It is important to
volved, and in others, the impact of institutional  sensitize Banr staff to good designs and proc-
reforms was limited by the lack of follow-up  esses, and to draw on experts when Bank staff
actions essential to their success.  are not experienced in process issues.
The importance of careful diagnosis of the  Complex institutional reforns should be
sectoral institutional framework cannot be  implemented a stage at a time, in a thoughtfui
overemphasized. The problem is less severe in  sequence.  If a simultaneous atta. . on different
such sectors as agriculture, where past project  fronts is necessary, a strategic approach to
and sector work has led to a better understanding  implementation must be planned - getting the
of sector institutions.  Attention to institutional  full support of top leaders who alone can influ-
diagnosis and design is especially important in  ence or control the actors involved and do team-
SECALs because of their quick disbursing  building, and following up with supervision and
nature and the limited time available for  rede-  monitoring for early identification of problems.
sign. There is greater flexibility for redesign for
a series of SECALs.  SECALs have not given enough attention to
building capabilities for policy analysis, a task
Most institutional diagnoses done for  that calls for staff-intensive supervision and a
SECALs focus on technical capabilities.  There  long-term perspective - which are seldorr,
is too little assessment of the interest groups  available in adjustment operations involvi .g
affected and the ability of top leaders to mobi-  many reforms.
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of this  paper  is gratefully  acknowledged.1.  The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to provide  an  overview  of the
institutional  reforms  in the  World  Bank's  sector  adjustment  operations
(SECALs)  and to  assess  the  Bank's  experience  in implementing  them. The
review  covers  institutional  reforms  in 55  of the  65 SECALs  approved  by the
Bank  during  fiscal  1983-87. They  include  SECALs  in  agriculture,  trade,  and
industry,  but  exclude  those  pertaining  to education  and  public  enterprises.
2.  Types  of Institutional  Reforms. The  institutional  reforms
designed  to  deal  with these  issues  in  the  SECALs  were  threefold:
(i) Organizational  restructuring  and strengthening  measures.
Restructuring  covered  a  wide spectrum  of reforms  which  includes
the  divestiture  of  public  agencies  or functious  and  the
reorganization  of existing  activities.  Orgaaizational
strengthening  consisted  of the  improvements  achieved  through
leadership  changes,  induction  of  competent  personnel,  new systems
and  practices  and  training.
(ii)  Regulatory  and  Rrocedural  reforms. The  rationalization  of the
sector's  regulations  and  procedures  was  a  necessary  reinforcement
to  the  SECALs'  policy  reforms. In some  instances  changes  in
existing  laws  were  required  to facilitate  the  implementation  of- ii  -
new  policies.  In  general,  the  focus  here  was  on  deregulation  and
procedural  improvements  and  not  on  the  reorganization  of
regulatory  institutions.
iii)  Sector  golicy  and  planning  caRacitv  buildlng. The  capacities
sought  to  be developed  through  this  type  of reform  were:  (a)
skills  to  develop  sector  strategies  and  to  monitor  sector
performance;  and (b)  specialized  skills  for  the  analysis  of
investments,  prices,  trade,  etc.  In some  cases,  special  units
were  proposed  to  be established  in  sector  ministries  or  other
agencies  as focal  points  for  policy  analysis  and  personnel
training.
3.  Policy-Institutional  Reforos  Linkages. Every  SECAL  reviewed  had
institutional  components  which  reflected  a  blend  of these  reforms.
*  Most institutional  reforms  were closely  linked  to  or derived  from
the  SECAL  policy  reforms. This  was  particularly  true  of
regulatory  and  procedural  reforms  which  flowed  from  the  need  to
implement  specific  policy  reforms.
*  The linkage  between  policy  and  institutional  reforms  was less
direct  when  the  latter  were  meant  to  facilitate  or  strengthen
supply  response  in  the  sector  concerned.- iii  -
*  A third  type  of institutional  reforms  (e.g.,  policy  analytic
capacity  building)  was  also indirectly  linked  to  current  SECAL
policy  reforms  as their  objective  was to  strengthen  the  sector
over  the  long  haul.
4.  Key  FeatureA.  Of all  the  institutional  reform  components,
organizational  restructuring  and  strengthening  was  the  most frequent
category,  followed  by policy  analytic  capacity  building  and  regulatory  and
procedural  reforms.
The  scope  of these  institutional  reforms  varied  somewhat  between
sectors  and  regions. Trade  SECALs,  which  had  a larger  share  of
macroeconomic  content  in  its  policy  reforms  than  other  types  of
SECALs,  had institutional  reforms  which  affected  different
sectors. SECALs  for  agriculture  and industry,  by contrast,  had
fewer  multi-sectoral  institutional  reforms. The  institutional
reforms  in  agriculture  SECALs  were  designed  to improve  the  sector
ministry  as  well as field  agencies  but  both  were  within  the
purview  of the  agriculture  sector  except  in  a few  cases.
*  In some  cases  the  sector  institutions  were  fragmented  and  intra-
sectoral  coordination  was  difficult. However,  in  many SECALs,
coordination  between  the  sector  ministries  and  the  core  financial
and  economic  authorities  was essential  for  their  success.- iv  -
*  In terms  of regions,  agriculture  and  industry  SEcALs  in  Africa  had
more limited  scope  than  those  in  Asia,  and  Europe,  Middle  East  and
North  Africa  (EMENA). The  Latin  America  and  Caribbean  (LAC)
SECALs  fell  in  between. Many  of the  African  agriculture  SECAIs,
for  example,  dealt  with  one  subsector  of agriculture  at a time
while  the  Asian  and  EMENA  SECALs  spanned  the  entire  sector. This
reflects  a  useful  attempt  on the  part  of the  Bank  staff  to  match
the  complexity  and  scope  of reform  to the  institutional  capacity
of the  countries  concerned.
*  Technical  assistance  (TA)  was  provided  for  in  Post  of the  SECALs.
Their  nature  and  scope,  however,  were  not  examined  in  this  review
as the  full  evidence  on TA  was  not  readily  available. This
subject  deserves  careful  study  as TA is an important  aid  to the
implementation  of  institutional  reforms.
5.  Problems  of  ImRlementation:
*  SECALs  do not  seem  to  have  been  an effective  vehicle  to implement
complex  institutional  reforms  especially  in  countries  withi  limited
institutional  capacities.
*  Over  a  fifth  of  all  SECALs encountered  serious  problems  of
implementation  on  the  institutional  front. A similar  number
reported  good  progress. Adequate  evidence  does  not  exist  toassess  the  impact  or outcome  of the  SECAL  institutional  reforms.
An initial  review  of their  implementation  experience,  however,
shows  that  while  conditionalities  were  met in  most  cases,  several
problems  were  encountered  in the  course  of supervision.  It  was
found  that  the  relatively  simpler  institutional  reforms  were
implemented,  while  the  rcore  complex  and  politically  sensitive
reforms  faced  severe  problems. Thus the  strengthening  of existing
organizations  or improving  specific  organizational  functions  were
easier  to accomplish  than  the  reorganization  or divestiture  of
public  agencies  which  threatened  important  political,  labor  or
bureaucratic  interests.
*  In some  cases,  the  persistent  macroeconomic  disorder  and the
weaknesses  of  macro-p-olicy  institutions  adversely  affected  SECAL
implementation.
*  Inadequate  institutional  diagnosis  and  consequent  design
weaknesses  also  seem  to  have concributed  to implementation
problems. Often  organizational  structure  and  staff  competence  in
limited  technical  areas  proved  easy  to improve,  but changes  in
organizational  processes  and  bureaucratic  procedures  were
difficult  to  design  and  implement.
6.  Institutional  Diagnosis
*  The importance  of a  careful  diagnosis  of the  sectoral- vi  -
institutional  framework  cannot  be overemphasized.  A mapping  of
the  relevant  institutions  concerned  with  sector  policy,  sector-
wide  management,  sector-wide  support  services  and  field  operations
should  be a starting  point  in all  SECALs,  even  in those  which  do
not  plan to  undertake  major  institutional  reforms.
*  Institutional  diagnosis  needs  to go  beyond  an assessment  of the
capacity  of institutions  in their  substantive  (technical)  areas  of
work. A joint  diagnostic  exercise  (by  the  borrower  and  the  Bank)
with  a mix  of technical,  organizational  and  political  analysis,
and  with  due  attention  to organizational  processes,  is  more likely
to  provide  a useful  basis  for  assessing  "implementation
feasibility."
*  Attention  to institutional  diagnosis  and  design  assumes  special
importance  in SECALs  in  view  of their  quick  disbursing  nature  and
the  limited  time  available  for  redesign. Where  a series  of SECALs
are  planned,  there  is  clearly  greater  flexibility  for  redesign.
7.  Seauencing  of Reforms. When  complex  institutional  reforms  are
proposed,  there  is  merit  in sequencing  them  so as to improve  the  chances  of
implementation  success. This  will  reduce  the  scope  of the  reforms,
problems  of coordination,  and  the  intensity  of threats  from  affected
interest  groups. For  example,  restructuring  of organizations  in  several
subsectors  simultaneously  could  become  unmanageable  for  the  reasons  given- vii  -
above. However,  in  a difficult  country  context,  if one  subsector  is  taken
at a time,  implementation  will tend  to  be easier  and  the  learning  could  be
used to  better  plan the  restructuring  of other  subsectors. If,  however,  a
simultaneous  attack  on  multiple  institutional  fronts  is  considered
necessary,  a strategic  approach  to the  reform  implementation  must  be
planned. This  means  getting  the  full  support  of the  top  leaders  who alone
can  influence  or control  the  relevant  actors  and  planning  for  team  building
and "organizational  development"  to  ensure  effective  implementation.
8.  Canacity  Building. Capacity  building  for  policy  analysis  deserves
more  attention  than  has  been  given  by SECALs. It is  a task  that  calls  for
staff  intensive  supervision  and  a long-term  perspective  which  are  seldom
provided  through  adjustment  operations  covering  a  wide  array  of reforms.
While  it is  understar.dable  that  reforms  with  an immediate  impact  receive
the  highest  priority  in  a crisis,  the  conventional  approach  to  policy
capacity  building,  even  with  repeater  loans,  needs  to  be challenged.  In
order  to augment  local  policy  analytic  capacity,  innovative  interventions
including,  for  example,  new  forms  of technical  assistance,  need  to  be
explored  outside  of the  adjustment  framework.INSTITUTIONAL  REFORMS  Ir SECTOR  ADJUSTMENT  OPERATIONS
I.  Introduction
Sector  adjustment  loans  (SECALs)  account  for  nearly  two  thirds  of
the  Bank's  total  adjustment  lending. During  the  period  fiscal  1979-87,  the
Bank  approved  70 SECALs  for  a total  of $9.4  billion. 1 In fiscal  1987,
SECALs'  share  of  adjustment  lending  increased  to  80 percent,  and  accounte-
for  19.5  percent  of all  Bank  lending. This  reflects  in  part the  broadenw..,
and  deepening  of the  adjustment  process  as countries  shift  their  attention
from  the  general  macr %conomic  to the  more  specific  sectoral  issues. It
also  reflects  the  growing  use  of  this  lending  instrument  in  countries  for
which  adjustment  in  a particular  sector  or sectors  is the  first  priority.
Depending  on the  country  context,  SECALs  tend  to include  a  wide  range  of
actions  from  the  reform  of aspects  of  macroeconomic  policy  to  the  creation
of suitable  policy  and  institutional  frameworks  for  sector  investment  and
efficiency  enhancement.  There  are  thus  overlaps  between  structural  and
sector  adjustment  operations  which  sometimes  make it  difficult  to
differentiate  between  the  two.
1/ See  Peter  Nicholas,  The  World  Bank's  Lending  for  Adjustment: An Interim
Report,  World  Bank  Discussion  Paper  No. 34,  (Washington,  D. C.,  1988),
pp.9-14.2-
Institutional  reforms  are  important  in  adjustment  programs  for  two
reasons. First,  while  some  policy  reforms  get  implemented  through  the
market  mechanism,  others  depend  heavily  on a  variety  of institutional
interventions  for  their  success. The  effectiveness  of  policy  reforms  in
the  latter  case is  1. -gely  a function  of the  appropriateness  of the
structures,  systems  and  practices  of implementing  institutions.  The
reference  here is  not  only  to individual  public  or  private  organizations,
but also  to the  broader  institutional  infrastructure  (e.g.,  the  operating
legal  system)  essential  for  policy  implementation.  Policy  and
institutional  reforms  are  thus  complementary.  Second,  the  continuing
review  and  reform  of policies  beyond  the  adjustment  period  require  the
creation  and  sustenance  of indigenous  institutional  capacity  in  both  the
public  and  private  sectors. The  development  of such  capacity  entails  not
only  organizational  reforms,  but also  an expansion  of the  stock  of well
trained  personnel  to  lead  and  manage  the  relevant  network  of  institutions.
Needless  to  say,  capacity  building  is  a  long-term  process,  but  adjustment
operations  are  a  useful  vehicle  to  initiate  it.  Recent  Bank  reports  have
drawn  attention  to the  impediments  to the  pace  of reform  posed  by
institutional  weaklnesses.  2
2/  See  Ibid;  ReRort  r,  Adjustment  Lending,  CEC,  1988;  Conditionality  in
World  Bank  LendinM: Its  Relation  to  Agricultural  Pricing  Policies,
Report  7357,  OED,  1988.- 31  -
This  paper  reviews  the  institutional  reforms  in 55  of the  65
SECALs  approved  by the  Bank  during  1983-87. They include  SECALs  in
agriculture  (23),  trade  (20)  and  industry  (12),  but  exclude  those  approved
prior  to fiscal  1983  and  those  pertaining  to education  and  public
enterprises. 3 The  purpose  of the  review  is  to  analyze  the  nature  and  scope
of the  institutional  reforms  adopted  by SECALs  and  to assess  the  experience
with respect  to their  implementation.  Section  II examines  the  types  of
policy  and  institutional  reforms  found  in SECALs  and  the  linkages  between
the  two.  Section  III  focuses  on the  design  features  of institutional
reforms  and their  sectoral  and  regional  patterns. The  implementation
experience  with  the  institutional  components  of  SECALs  is then  assessed  in
Section  IV.  The  conclusions  and  policy  implications  of the  review  are
presented  in  Section  V.  The  primary  sources  of  data  used  in the  study  are
Bank  documents  (President's  reports,  appraisal  reports,  supervision
reports,  project  completion  reports,  and  project  files)  and  interviews  with
selected  Bank  staff.
Basic  data  on the  55  SECALs  under  review  are  given  in  Annex  1.
Sub-saharan  African  countries  received  nearly  half  of all  SECALs. Less
than  a third  of the  SECALs  went  to the  Latin  America  and  Caribbean  (IAC)
Region  and  about  a fifth  to  Asian  and  European,  Middle  East  and  North
African  (EMENA)  countries. There  were  wide  variations  in the  loan/credit
2/  Only six  SECALs  were  approved  prior  to  1983. SECALs  for  education  are
too  few (3)  to  be assessed.  See  John  Nellis'  A Review  of Public
Enterprise  Reform  in  Adiustment  Lending,  April  1988,  for  a review  of
public  enterprise  SECALs.amounts  and  their  planned  duration. Thus  the  Brazil  agriculture  SECAL
amounted  to $500  million  whereas  the  Malawi  and  Burkina  agriculture  SECALs
were  for  $5  million  and  $9.2  millior  respectively.  The  Argentina  trade
SECAL's  duration  was  one  year  in contrast  to  Hungary  industry  SECAL's  six
years. As of  mid-1988,  23  of the  55 SECAL  operations  have  been  closed,  but
project  completion  reports  are  available  only  for  eight.
SECALs  are  not  necessarily  preceded  by structural  adjustment
operations  (SALs)  in  all  cases  (see  Annex  2).  In fact,  over  a third  of the
SECALs  were the  first  policy  based  operations  in  the  countries  concerned.
SALs  preceded  SECALs  in  about  a quarter  of the  cases. SALs,  however,
followed  SECALs  in a fifth  of the  cases. SECALs  were repeated  (series  of
two  or three  in the  same  sector)  in ten  countries  out  of the  34  with  SECAL.
operations.
AI.  Policy  and  Institutional  Reforms: &alQr  FeatuXes
The  primary  focus  of all  SECALs  is  on the  reform  of  policies  which
affect  sector  performance.  Improved  sector  policies  are  expected  to
promote  the  overall  adjustment  process  of the  economy. The  policy  reforms
most commonly  found  in the  55  SECALs  could  be divided  into  four  categories:
(a)  Trade  policy  reforms,  which  focused  on export  promotion  policies
and  services,  import  liberalization  and  tariff  reforms,  and  the
maintenance  of a flexible  exchange  rate;(b)  financial  reforms  which  emphasized  the  decontrol  of interest
rates,  reform  of financial  systems,  expenditure  control,  and  cost
recovery;
(c)  rationalization  of  public  and  private  sector  roles  through  the
reform  of  policies  concerning  public  enterprises  and  private
sector  promotion;  and
(d)  production  and investment  related  reforms  which included  elemertd
such  as the  decontrol  of  prices,  investment  delicensing  and
provision  of incentives,  tax/subsidy  reform,  and  sector  support
services.
In terms  of the  frequency  of occurrence  in  SECALs,  trade  policy
reforms  and  production  and  investment  related  reforms  were the  most
frequent,  accounting  for  34%  and  33%  of  policy  reforms  respectively
(Table  1).  Financial  reforms  (17%  of policy  reforms)  and  public-private
sector  rationalization  (16%  of policy  reforms)  followed  in  that  order. The
relative  importance  of these  categories  was  significantly  different  only  in
the  agriculture  SECALs. Production  and  investment  related  reforms  were  the
dominant  category  (45%  of policy  reforms)  in  agriculture,  followed  by trade
reforms  (19%)  and  public-private  sector  rationalization  (19%). This
pattern  reflects,  for  the  most  part,  the  differences  in SECAL  objectives
between  different  sectors. Thus  agriculture  SECALs  focused  on the
adjustment  of  production  and  investment  incentives  and  enhancement  of the
efficiency  and  effectiveness  of input  procurement,  credit,  marketing,6-
research  and  other  technical  services. Trade  SECALs,  on the  other  hand,
emphasized  the  elimination  of trade  distortions  and  the  improvement  of
balance  of  payments  especially  through  export  promotion. Industry  SECALs
also  had trade  related  objectives  in  addition  to the  promotion  of  domestic
competition.
Table  1
POLICY REFORMS: PERCENTAGE  OF SECTOR  TOTALS  IN EACH  OF FOUR  POLICY  REFORM  TYPES
Reform  Trade  Monetary  Rationalization  Production  &
Policy  & Financial  of  Pub.  & Priv.  Inrestment-Related  TOTAL
Sector  Reforms  Reforms  Sector  Roles  Reforms
2  I  I  2  2
Industry  36.5  19.0  19.0  25.4  100.0
------------------------------------------------------------------ __---------__-------------------------
Agriculture  19.3  17.6  18.5  44.5  100.0
Trade  56.6  13.2  9.2  21.1  100.0
TOTAL  34.5  16.7  15.9  32.9  100.0
Institutional  Issues
Three  important  categories  of institutional  issues  were identified
in the  SECALs  under  review. First,  a good  number  of SECALs  considered  the
organizational  and  managerial  deficiencies  of sector  institutions  as a
major  constraint  on the  adjustment  process. The rationale  for  the
existence  of some  institutions,  and  their  focus  and  functions  were  called
into  question  by the  proposed  policy  reforms. For  instance,  the  proposed-7-
liberalization  measures  in some  cases  made the  functions  of some  of the
existing  regulatory  agencies  redundant.  The  policy  decision  to  expand  the
private  sector  meant  that  some  of the  parastatals  had  to  be phased  out.
Sector  institutions  (departments,  bureaus,  enterprises)  which  had  poor
leadership,  inappropriate  organizational  structures  and  systems,  and  staff
with limited  skills  and  poor  motivation  needed  to  be reorganized  and
strengthened.  In some  cases,  new agencies  were to  be created  to  deal  with
changing  priorities.
Second,  a  variety  of regulatory  and  procedural  constraints  had  to
be eliminated  or streamlined  in  order  to enable  governments  to implement
policy  reforms. Trade  liberalization,  for  example,  called  for  the
simplification  of import  and  export  procedures  and  abolition  of superfluous
trade  regulations.  Reform  of industrial  policies  and  abolition  of
administrative  controls  necessitated  the  revision  of laws,  regulations  and
procedures,  not  only  to guide  investors  and  managers,  but  also  to instill  a
sense  of confidence  and  a  perception  of  policy  stability  in  potential
entrepreneurs  and  in  other  participants  in the  sector's  activities.
Agriculture  SECALs  frequently  provided  for  the  liberalization  of internal
agricultural  markets  and  improvements  in  the  administration  of price
stabilization  programs  through  market  intervention  rather  than  through
regulation.
Third.  policy  analytic  and  planning  functions  within  sector
ministries  and  other  public  agencies  needed  to  be strengthened  and  their
role  in the  policy  process  needed  to  be enhanced. In some  cases,  reliable-8-
staff  were  unable  to  make a  contribution  because  the  process  bypassed  them.
In other  cases,  the  staff  in these  institutions  did  not  possess  the  skills
and  experience  required  to  perform  the  new roles  and  functions  expected  of
them. For  example,  generation  and  analysis  of  policy  alternatives,  review
of policies  in light  of the  feedback  through  continuous  monitoring,  and  the
development  of sector  strategies  and  their  linkages  with  other  sectors  are
tasks  which  require  a  very  different  set  of skills  than  those  required  for
bureaucratic  activities  such  as import  licensing  or the  administrative
allocatinn  of foreign  exchange  and  agricultural  inputs. In  some  instances,
SECALs  identified  the  absence  of an organizational  focal  point  within  the
sector  ministries  to  Fpan  and  perform  these  new  functions  and  the  lack  of
skills  on Lhe  part  of sector  staff  to initiate  and  manage  these  functions.
Reorientation  of the  bureaucracy  and  the  development  of policy  related
skills  in sector  ministries  were  seen  as  prerequisites  for  building  this
capacity.
Institutional  Reforms
The institutional  reforms  designed  to deal  with  these  issues  in
the  SECALs  were threefold:  organizational  restructuring  and  strengthening
measures,  regulatory  and  procedural  reforms,  and  interventions  for  building
policy  and  planning  capacity. In  several  SECALs,  these  reforms  entailed
areas  and  institutions  beyond  the  specific  sector  involved. The  relative
frequency  of the  three  categories  varied  from  one  SECAL  to  another.
Table  2  provides  a comparative  picture  of the  types  of institutional
reforms  included  under  the  trade,  industry  and  agriculture  SECALs  and  the
frequency  of each  type  within  each  sector,  as indicated  by the  percentages.Organizational  restructuring  and  strengthening  led  the  set  of institutional
reforms. This  category  accounted  for  44%  of all  institutional  reforms.
Reforms  for  building  policy  and  planning  capacity  and  regulatory  and
procedural  reforms  were  much  less  frequent  (28%  and  27%  respectively).
Within  the  organizational  restructuring  and  strengthening  category,
"strengthening"  measures  were  the  most frequent  overall  and "divestitu-e"
the  least  common. 4 Table  3  provides  details  of institutional  reforms  by
subcategory  and  sector. Additional  data  on institutional  reform
components,  disaggregated  by SECAL,  are  given  in  Annex  3.
Table  2
FREQUENCY  OF INSTITUTIONAL  REFORMS
Policy  Planning  Organizational  Restructuring  Regulatory  end
Capacity  Building  and  Strengthening  Procedural  Reform  TOTAL
----------------------------------------------------------------- __----------__----------------------------
Number  I  Number  A  Number  I  Number
-------------------------------------------------------------------- __-------__-----------------------------
Industry  13  25  21  40  19  36  53
----------------------------------------------------------------------- __----__----------------------------
Agriculture  38  32  52  44  29  24  119
---------------------------------------------------------------------- __-----__-----------------------------
Trade  13  24  27  50  14  26  54
----------------------------------------------------------------------- __----__-----------------------------
TOTAL  64  28  100  44  62  27  226
/  Divestiture  figured  in  several  public  enterprise  SECALs,  but  overall  the
latter  were  a small  number  relative  to  the  SECALs  reviewed  here.Table  3
IISTITUTIOIL  REFOSR  Detailed  C"op.mtu
Policy  Pliing  Orgaai.ational  Rhataucturing  a  Streastbsnig  Regulatory  an  Procedural  Reform  TOTAL
Sector/  Budgeting  Other  Creation  Tariff/Prce
Subsector  & Pub.  Invest.  Tech.  Divestiture  Reorga-  Streg-  of  a  n  Dereg.of  Baort  IMozt  Subiw
Stratey  Prorsning  Skills  Withdzaw.l  aLsation  thenlng  Entity  markets  Procedures  Procedure  procedure
Industry  4  S  4  4  7  7  3  4  5  4  4  3
A4ricultur  8  13  17  11  13  17  11  14  3  6  6  119
Trade  9  - 4  3  9  7  s  1  3  - 34
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________--__--
TOTAL  21  18  23  18  29  31  22  19  14  17  10  226
1  3  2  I  I  2  2  I  2  2
Induatry  7.5  9.4  7.5  7.3  13.2  13.2  5.7  7.5  9.4  11.3  7.5  100
Agriculture  6.7  10.9  14.3  9.2  10.9  14.3  9.2  11.8  2.5  5.0  3.0  100
Trade  16.7  - 7.4  5.6  16.7  13.0  14.8  1.9  14.8  9.3  - 100
TOTAL  9.3  8.0  11.1  8.0  12.8  13.7  9.7  8.4  7.1  7.5  4.4  1001.  Organizational  Restructuring  and  Strengthening
Within  a sector,  restructuring  and  strengthening  could  be planned
for  a set  of institutions  such  as ministries,  their  subordinate  agencies
and  enterprises. It is  useful  to  distinguish  among  three  types  of reform
in  this  category. Firgt,  a  policy  and  institutional  diagnosis  could  lead
to the  conclusion  that  government  must  divest  some  of its  activities  in the
concerned  sector. Divestiture  or elimination  of  certain  sectoral
organizations  may then  fol'.ow.  This,  of course,  is the  most  politically
sensitive  form  of restructuring.  Second,  adjustment  may  call  for  the
reorganization  of some  or all  of the  sector  agencies  and the  creation  of
new  agencies. Some  agencies  may  be  merged  with  others  or their  functions
and  responsibilities  altered  significantly.  The  power  relationships  and
influence  patterns  within  the  institutional  network  may then  undergo  major
changes. This  type  of restructuring  may  take  place  with  or without
divestiture.  Third,  sector  agencies  may  need  to  be improved  or
strengthened  without  their  having  to  be reorganized  in  terms  of their
structures.  Such  organizational  improvements  may  be  brought  about  through
leadership  changes,  the  introduction  of  more  efficient  internal  management
systems  and  practices,  changes  in  the  incentives  for  the  staff,  recruitment
of  more  competent  personnel,  and  training  to  upgrade  the  technical  and
managerial  skills  of the  staff.
In the  Bangladesh  industrial  sector  credit,  Morocco  industry  SECAL
II,  and  the  Zaire  industry  SECAL,  improvement  of the  efficiency  of sectoral
public  enterprises  was  high  on the  reform  agenda. Increased  autonomy  to- 12 -
the  enterprises  and  experiments  with  a new  performance  evaluation  system
were among  the  measures  taken  up under  these  SECALs. Reorganization  of the
publ'e  enterprises  was  proposed  in the  Morocco  II  and  the  Madagascar
industry  SECALs. In ths  Hungary,  Korea  and  Morocco  cases  where  financial
sector  reforms  were to  be implemented,  the  local  banks'  capacity  for
general  management  and  project  appraisal  was to  be strengthened  through
training. Organizational  strengthening  encompassed  both  sectoral  and  non-
sectoral  institutions  as in the  case  of the  Ghana  industry  SECAL  which
sought  to support  the  Central  Bureau  of  Statistics,  the  Ghana  Standards
Board  and the  Food  Research  Institute.  Divestiture  of  public  enterprises
figured  only in  three  industry  SECALs--Madagascar  II,  Morocco  II and
Zambia. 5 Divestiture  of  public  sector  activities  such  as input
distribution,  veterinary  services,  and  agro-processing  was  proposed  for
action  and/or  study  in 11  agriculture  SECALs.
2.  Regulatory  and  Procedural  Reforms
Changes  in  the  legal  framework  at the  sector  level  became
necessary  both to  ensure  consistency  with  the  proposed  policy  reforms  and
to enable  governments  to  make  known  to the  public  at large,  and  to
investors/entrepreneurs  in  particular,  the  new  incentives,  autonomy  and
legal  safeguards  available  to them. In the  industry  sector,  SECALs
provided  for  the  revision  of investment  codes  or the  creation  of  new  codes.
./  Note  that  separate  public  enterprise  SECALs  dealt  with this  issue  in
several  other  countries.- 13 -
Decrees  were promulgated  to  establish  new  agencies  to implement  investment
codes.  In  some  cases,  the  charters  of financial  institutions  and
parastatals  were  to  be amended  to enable  them  to  undertake  activities
consistent  with the  new  policies. Under  the  Tunisia  industrial  and  trade
SECAL,  a new investment  code  was  designed  and  approved. This  SECAL  also
provided  for  a decree  to entrust  the  implementation  of the  new  code  to  a
committee  independent  of the  existing  industrial  promotion  agency  which  was
considered  ineffective.  The  Morocco  industrial  and  trade  SECAL  II,
provided  for  a special  law  to enable  specialized  banks  to accept  deposits
from  the  public. The  Morocco  agriculture  SECAL  II sought  legal  and
technical  proposals  to  reform  the  forestry  sector  in order  to improve
natural  resource  management. The  Zambia  industrial  SECAL  required  the
legislation  of a  new investment  act  to  remove  the  barriers  to the  role  of
the  private  sector. In  Argentina,  &,i  act  of Congress  was  necessary  to
institute  a land  tax  which  was  supposed  to partially  replace  export  taxes.
However,  this  step  was  not  taken  by the  government.
In a  number  of  countries,  there  was  no need  to revise  existing
laws  or enact  new ones  to  promote  sector  adjustment.  The  constraints  were
perceived  to  be in  the  regulations  and  procedures  in  effect,  and in  the
manner  in  which  they  were Implemented.  These  reforms  were  expected  to
reduce  the  delays  in  complying  with regulatory  requiremen-ts  and  to  simplify
the  procedures  used  so that  the  public  could  be served  more  effectively  and
efficiently. Improvements  in  the  administrative  procedures,  the
preparation  of  manuals  to provide  guidance  to  those  engaged  in imports  and
exports,  and  the  dissemination  of such  information  to the  public  were some
of the  actions  proposed  under  this  category.-14-
Among  agriculture  SECALs,  the  Philippine  agriculture  SECAL  sought
a study  of the  regulations  governing  fertilizer  production,  import  and
distribution.  The  Morocco  Agriculture  SECAL  II required  the  deregulation
of  cereal  marketing. The  Uruguay  agricultural  sector  loan  provided  for  the
simplification  of import  procedures  for  agricultural  inputs. Revision  of
procurement  procedures  and  practices  and  the  adoption  of safety  standards
for  pesticides  were  among  the  conditions  of the  Sudan  agriculture  SECAL  II.
Among  industry  SECALs,  the  Zambia  and  Madagascar  SECALs  sought  the
simplification  of export  procedures.  The  Mauritius  industry  SECAL  required
that  tariffs  and the  duty  drawback  system  be simplified.  The  Morocco
industry  and  trade  SECAL  I  provided  for  the  simplification  of export
certification  requ4.rements,  the  publication  of a customs  manual,  and  an
information  campaign  to  advise  entrepreneurs  about  the  government's  medium-
term  objectives  for  tariff  and  non-tariff  protection.
3.  Policy  and  Planning  Capacity  Enhancement
Three  types  of  improvements  in  policy  and  planning  systems  and
skills  were  emphasized  in  the  SECALs under  review.  First,  the  capacity  to
analyze  policies,  plan  sector  strategies  and  monitor,  and  evaluate
performance  were to  be strengthened.  Seco,  speciaL  attention  was  given
to  the  improvement  of  public  investment  programming  systems.  IThir,
upgrading  local  skills  in  foreign  trade  analysis,  and  other  specialized
areas  were  considered  relevant  in some  cases;  e.g.,  forecasting  prices,
exports,  imports,  and  foreign  exchange  reserves. In  a number  of  cases,- 15  -
special  units  were  proposed  to  be set  up in sector  ministries  or related
agencies  to  undertake  the  required  policy  analysis  and  planning  and  to  be
focal  points  for  the  training,  development  and  supervision  of  professional
staff.
Under  the  Sudan  agriculture  SECAL  II,  a special  unit  was  created
in the  Agriculture  Ministry  to forecast  and  monitor  the  recurrent  foreign
exchange  needs  of the  agriculture  sector. In  the  Morocco  agriculture  SECAL
I, the  Directorate  of Planning  and  Economic  Affairs  in the  Ministry  of
Agriculture  was to  be strengthened  to  monitor  overall  sector  and  subsector
budgetary  allocations  as  well  as allocations  for  priority  projects. The
Burkina  Fertilizer  SECAL  not  only  assigned  the  project  management  task  to
the  Agricultural  Imports  Unit in  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  but also
provided  support  to  the  Unit to improve  its  long-term  capacity  to  undertake
policy  analysis. The  Ghana  industry  SECAL's  program  included  support  to
the  Ministry  of Industries,  Science  and  Technology  for  data  collection,
policy  formulation  and  monitoring,  to the  Bank  of Ghana  in  respect  of
project  appraisal  and  supervision  techniques,  and  to the  Ministry  of
Finance  and  Economic  Planning  for  the  formulation  and  monitoring  of trade
and  tariff  policies. In the  Hungary  industry  SECAL, a restructuring
program  office  was  created  to  assist  in  upgrading  investment  programming
and  planning  capacity. In the  Korea  industry  and  finance  SECAL  II,  the
focus  was on specialist  staff  training. Sixty  Ministry  of Finance
officials  were sent  abroad  for  training  in  policy  analytic  and  planning-
related  subjects.- 16
Linkages  between  Policy  and  Institutional  Reforms
Institutional  reforms  fall  into  three  categories  in terms  of their
links  with  policy  reforms. (a)  those  directly  linked  to the  policy  reforms
in a given  SECAL;  (b)  those  required  to  facilitate  the  sector's  supply
response;  and (c)  broader  reforms  designed  to support  sector  development
beyond  the  adjustment  process. Examples  of the  three  types  of linkagAs  are
given  below:
1)  Institutional  reforms  are  directly  linked  to  policy  reforms  when
the  execution  of the  latter  requires  the  simultaneous  implementation  of the
former. This  was  particularly  true  for  regulatory  and  procedural  reforms
which  were  derived  from  the  need to implement  specific  policy  reforms.
Trade  liberalization,  for  example,  invariably  calls  for  the  revision,
simplification  or elimination  of export  and  import  regulations.  The  need
here  is  immediate  and  the  regulatory  reforms  have to  be tailored  to  meet
the  requirements  of the  new  policy. For  example,  one  of the  objectives  of
the  Argentina  agriculture  SECAL  was  to remove  trade  distortions  which  were
depressing  exports. The  policy  reform  corresponding  to this  was  a
reduction  of export  taxes,  and  a  commitment  on the  part  of the  government
to introduce  a  land  tax  to  replace  the  export  taxes. The  required
institutional  reform  followed  logically  from  this  policy  reform. In this
case,  it  became  necessary  to  establish  the  instituitional  basis  for
administering  a land  tax  and  to  present  draft  legislation  authorizing  a
federal  land  tax  to  the  Argentine  Congress.- 17 -
2)  In  certain  contexts  sector  policy  reforms  will evoke  the  required
supply  response  only  when  complementary  institutional  actions  are  taken.
Thus,  in agriculture,  price  reform  does  not  always  trigger  the  desired
level  and  speed  of supply  response  from  farmers  when  the  sector  is  plagued
by inadequacies  in infrastructure,  support  services  and  private  sector
capabilities  in general. Price  reform  in  such  cases  needs  to  be follow.ed
up with  measures  to eliminate  these  inadequacies  by strengthening  or
restructuring  the  relevant  institutions  (e.g.,  extension,  credit,  research,
etc).  In trade  SECALs,  policy  reforms  such  as liberalization  and
devaluation  are followed  up with institutional  measures  to  strengthen
export  promotion  and financing.  Three  of the  20  trade  SECALs  were
concerned  primarily  with strengthening  export  promotion  and  financing
agencies  (institutional  reforms). The  focus  of the  Sierra  Leone
agriculture  SECAL,  for  example,  was  on the  reorganization  and strengthening
of agriculture  sector  institutions.
3)  There  are  broader  institutional  reforms  which  do  not  have  a close
or direct  linkage  to current  SECAL  policy  reforms. Here  the  objective  is
to  promote  long-term  sector  development  and  the  actions  taken  may  or  may
not  benefit  or  buttress  the  current  set  of  policy  reforms  under
implementation.  Many of the  SECAL  institutional  components  classified
under  the  capacity  enhancement  category,  for  example,  were aimed  more  at
improving  policymaking  and  sector  management  in general  than  at
implementing  specific  policies. In this  sense,  they  did  not follow  from
current  policy  reforms. For  example,  the  assistance  to  the  statistics
department  in the  Ministry  of Plan  in  Somalia  appears  to  be aimed  at- 18 -
improving  the  statistical  base for  sector  policymaking.  Of course,  many  of
the  improvements  would  also  help  the  government  in the  short  run,  as
information  gathered  during  regular  operations  would  be fed  back to central
agencies  and  used  to adjust  and  revise  policies. In the  Colombia  trade
SECAL,  policy  reforms  focused  on freeing  up the  license  regime,  reduction
of tariff  levels,  and  lowering  import  barriers  for  raw  material  supply  to
industries  supplying  inputs  to agriculture  and :he  like. As tor
institutional  reforms,  the  strengthening  of technical  analysis  capacity  in
the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  the  creation  of the  National  Agricultural
Policy  Board  were considered  important.  Although  the  goal  was in  part  to
assist  in the  operation  of this  particular  SECAL,  the  skills  and
organization  being  developed  were  really  aimed  at future  programs,  and  were
not  directly  linked  to the  SECAL  policy  reforms.
The  Scope  of Institutional  Reforms
The  scope  of institutional  reforms  varied  somewhat  between  sectors
and  regions. Scope  here refers  to the  spectrum  of organizations  and
sectors  touched  by the  reforms. Trade  SECALs,  which  had a larger  share  of
macroeconomic  content  in their  policy  reforms  than  other  types  of SECALs,
had institutional  reforms  which  affected  multiple  sectors. SECALs  for
agriculture  and  industry,  by contrast,  had  fewer  multi-sectoral
institutional  reforms. The institutional  reforms  in  agriculture  SECALs
were  designed  to improve  the  sector  ministry  as  well  as field  agencies;  but
both  were  within  the  purview  of the  agriculture  sector,  except  in  a few
cases. Some  regional  trends  were  noted: agriculture  and  industry  SECALs- 19  -
in  Africa  had more  limited  scope  than  those  in  Asia and  EMENA. The  IAC
SECALs  fell  in  between. Many of the  African  agriculture  SECALs,  for
example,  dealt  with  one subsector  of agriculture  at a time,  while  the  Asian
and  EMENA  SECALs  spanned  the  entire  sector. In  general,  this  pattern
matched  the  institutional  capacities  and  levels  of development  in  the
countries  involved.
III. Institutional  Reforms: Diagnosis  and  Design
Ideally,  the  design  of institutional  reform  should  flow  from  a
systematic  analysis  of the  relevant  institutional  issues  within  the
framework  of the  SECAL  objectives  and  policy  reforms. Institutional
diagnosis  is  relatively  easy  when  policy  reforms  are  limited  in  scope  or
when there  is  a close  linkage  between  policy  and  institutional  reforms.
Thus in some  cases,  all  the  import  liberalization  and  export  promotion
reforms  may  need to  be reinforced  by a set  of regulatory  and  procedural
reforms. This  will typically  call  for  a  review  of existing  trade
regulations  and  procedures. The  ;.tter  are  easily  identified  and  their
reform  (elimination,  simplification,  etc.)  may  not  be difficult  to design.
On the  other  hand,  if trade  liberalization  has  a wider  scope  and  calls  for
the  elimination  or restructuring  of existing  public  agencies,  the
institutional  diagnosis  involved  becomes  more complex  and  the  design  of the
required  institutional  reforms  will  tend  to  attract  a greater  degree  of- 20 -
political  and  bureaucratic  resistance.  A simplistic  analysis  which  fails
to take into  account  these  sensitive  differences  will  adversely  affect  both
the  design  and implementation  of the  reforms.
The task  of institutional  diagnosis  was,  in  many cases,
facilitated  by the  Bank  staff's  long-standing  familiarity  with  and
knowledge  of a sector. In  most  agriculture  SECALs,  this  was  an advantage
as there  was a  history  of  project  lending  and  sector  work in the  countries
involved. This  was less  true  of trade  SECALs  as sector  work  on trade  was
relatively  new.  Industry  SECALs  fell  somewhere  in  between.
An example  of a good  institutional  diagnosis  is found  in the
Morocco  agriculture  SECAL  I.  The  initial  diagnosis  was  based  on  previouL
studies  and  the  Bank's  experience  with  country  project  lending. Subsector
specific  and  policy  reform  specific  institutional  issues  were  then
identified  during  the  preparation  phase. These  issues  included  a  variety
of organizational  deficiencies  such  as lack  of  managerial  and  financial
autonomy,  lack  of staff  capacity,  skills  and incentives  both  for  policy
planning  and  service  delivery,  and  their  institutional  implications  for
specific  policy  reforms. The  diagnostic  work  was accomplished  through  the
use  of local  working  groups  and  a strong  policy  dialogue  by Bank  staff  with
Moroccan  counterparts  at middle  and  top  levels  and  through  a didactic  use
of  analytical  work in support  of design. The diagnosis  led  to  a
segmentation  of institutional  reforms  into  component  parts  and  to the
phasing  of their  implementation.  For  example,  the  reorganization  and
strengthening  of the  extension  system  was  to  be attempted  in  phases. The-21  -
first  SECAL  operation  initiated  a low  cost  pilot  program  to strengthen  the
content  and  staffing  of the  extension  service  in 28  rainfed  areas  through
the  introduction  of the  training  and  visit  model. The  coverage  was then  to
be expanded  in the  second  operation.
In the  Jamaica  trade  SECAL,  on the  other  hand,  an  export
development  fund  was created,  and  assigned  to the  Export  Credit  Insurance
Corporation  for  management.  The institutional  context  of  export  promotion,
however,  was  not  well  understood  in  this  case  and  the  corporation  was not
properly  oriented  or equipped  to  handle  the  fund. As a result,  the
assessment  of the  corporation's  capacity  was inadequate  during  the
preparation  phase. In contrast,  the  Tunisia  industry  SECAL  had a
systematic  discussion  of the  institutional  issues  relevant  to  its  policy
reforms  and  an  extensive  analysis  of the  regulatory  and  support
institutions  within  the  sector.
The  scope  and  depth  of the  institutional  diagnosis  required  for  a
SECAL  will  depend  to a large  extent  on the  complexity  of its  objectives  and
the  range  of its  policy  and  institutional  issues. The  salient  features  of
institutional  diagnosis  and  design  in  the  SECALs  here  reviewed  were  the
following:
(1)  The  complexity  of  the  institutional  reforms  undertaken  by
different  SECALs varied  considerably.  To  understand  the  nature  and  causes
of  this  phenomenon,  the  SECALs were  divided  into  two  groups  according  to- 22 -
their  "institutional  intensity." 6 A majority  of the  low  intensity  SECALs
were the  first  policy-based  sector  loans  in the  countries  concerned  whereas
a  majority  of the  high  intensity  SECALs  were  either  repeat  loans/credits  or
were  preceded  by other  SECALs  or SALs. The  rationale  of the  more  complex
institut'onal  reforms  undertaken  by the  high intensity  SECALs  is that  some
learning  had already  taken  place  and  that  a foundation  had  been  laid  for
more  complex  interventions.  In  several  cases,  the  staff  involved  seem  to
have  concluded  that  careful  preparatory  work should  precede  the  launchirg
of complex  reforms. It  was  also  found  that  the  diagnosis  of  institutional
issues  in the  high intensity  SECALs  was  generally  more thorough  and
systematic  than  the  diagnosis  underlying  the  low  intensity  SECALs. From  a
design  standpoint,  this  would  appear  to  be lo;ical.
(2)  In general,  institutional  diagnosis  focused  on the  technical
aspects  of service  delivery  and  of institutions.  For  example,  the
technical  skills  required  by the  staff  and  the  analytical  functions  to  be
performed  by  certain  institutions  were  assessed.  The  impact  of  interest
groups  on  the  working  of  the  institutions,  the  likely  resistance  to  reforms
i/ A SECAL  was considered  high in institutional  intensity  if  its
institutional  reforms  were  dominated  by  organizational  restructuring  and
policy  cakpacity  building,  and  low  if the  institutional  reforms  were
limited  relative  to  policy  reforms  or  were  dominated  by  regulatory  and
procedural  reforms  and/or  organizational  strengthening.  Low  intensity
may  or  may  not  be appropriate  depending  on SECAL  objectives  and  country
contexts.- 23 -
from  the  political  or  bureaucratic  fronts  and  an assessment  of the  risks
involved  in the  proposed  reforms  seem  to  have  been  neglected. The
following  comment  on trade  SECALs  illustrates  this  point.
"In  trade,  for  example,  conditions  on reductions  in tariffs  and
QRs  have  been  more  fully  met  than  those  on improvements  in  export
financing. The  reason  is  not  that  the  former  are  more  politically
palatable  than  the  latter--the  reverse  is  almost  certainly  the
case.  Instead,  the  reason  is  that  export  finance  often  involves
institutional  changes  which  are  more  difficult  and take  more time
to implement.  "7
(3)  Similarly,  the  capacity  of the  organizations  and  their  top
management  to steer  the  reforms  and  get  results  was seldom  assessed.
Effectiveness  depends,  not  only  on the  formal  organization  and its
structure,  but also  on the  clout  of top  managers  to  mobilize  and  use
resources  to their  advantage  and  their  capacity  to  communicate  and  garner
support  for  SECAL  objectives  from  the  relevant  stakeholders.  The
managerial  and  leadership  dimension  does  not seem  to  have received  much
attention  in  the  diagnosis. It is  possible  that  such  issues  were  discussed
informally  by Bank  staff  but  not  recorded  in  files.
(4)  A thorough  institutional  diagnosis  does  not  necessarily  guarantee
a  competent  design  of institutional  reform. There  were  cases  where
knowledge  of  what  was  wrong  was adequate,  but  enough  attention  was  not
given  to designing  a reform  to rectify  the  problem. Under  the  Uruguay
agriculture  SECAL,  a national  extension  service,  which  catered  to  the
livestock  sector,  was to  expand  its  operations  to include  the  crop
1/ See  Report  on Adjustment  Lending,  August  1988,  p. 89.- 24  -
subsector. Additional  funds  were  provided  for  the  expansion  under  the
program,  but  there  was apparently  no design  for  integrating  the  new
services  into  the  existing  organization.  It  could  be that  time  constraints
and  the  lack  of local  knowledge  made  it difficult  for  some  Bank  staff  to
attend  to  the  details  of the  design  of institutional  reforms.
(5)  Joint  institutional  diagnosis  and  design  (between  the  Bank  and
borrower)  were features  of  a number  of SECALs. They  were  particularly
helpful  in assessing  potential  resistance  to  reform  and  subtle
organizational  features  and  constraints  which  were  not  obvious  to the
outsider. The  Morocco  SECAL  referred  to above  and  the  Somalia  agriculture
SECAL  illustrate  this  approach. In  Somalia,  five  task  forces  were
established  to study  key issues  in the  agricultural  sector. Each  task
force  was  chaired  by A  Somali  official  and  was  staffed  by government
officials  and  consultants.  Their  reports  formed  the  basis  of the  SECAL.
The  Bank's  project  preparation  facility  (PPF)  has  been  used  to good
advantage  for  this  purpose  in  some  agriculture  SECALs.
Conditionality
As in  policy  reforms,  conditionality  applied  to institutional
reforms  too. In all,  the  55 SECALs  had a total  of 362  conditions  on the
institutional  side. These  conditions  fell  into  three  categories:
(1)  those  requiring  a study;  (2)  those  which  require  an action  plan  to  be
prepared;  and  (3)  those  linked  to the  execution  and  completion  of a- 25 -
specific  reform. In  addition,  several  SECALs  had  a general  condition  which
called  for  "satisfactory  progress"  of the  program  as a  whole (hovering  both
policy  and  institutional  reforms). Details  of  conditions  by type  and
sector  are  given  in  Table  4.
Table  4
CONDITIONALITY  IN  SECALS
By  Sector  and  Type  of Condition
---------------------------------------------------------------- __-----------__--------------------
No. of  Conditins  by  Type  No.  of  SZCALs  with
Sector  Gen-ral  Condition  for
-----------------------------------------  ~--------------  Satisfactory  Progress
Executing  a  Ln  Overall  PrograE
Study  Action  Plan  Reform  Kesure  TOTAL
Agriculture  16  25  103  144  6
Industry  15  30  65  110  7
Trade  3  14  91  108  9
TOTAL  34  69  259  362  22
The  preparation  of studies  or action  plans  was  stipulated  as
conditions  when (a)  an institutional  reform  was  expected  to face
difficulties  due  to the  pressure  of  vested  interests  or governmental
incapacity  or (b)  when the  details  of the  reform  needed  to  be further
developed  or future  reforms  were  to  be prepared. In  the  Philippine
agriculture  SECAL,  studies  were  sought  through  the  SECAL  with respect  to
agencies  such  as the  Coconut  Authority  and  the  Sugar  Commission.  They  were
to  be studied  before  reform  actions  were to  be identified.  At the  initial- 26  -
stage,  the  powerful  coterie  that  ran  these  agencies  would  not  have
permitted  any  further  action. In the  Madagascar  industry  SECAL  II,  the
public  enterprise  rehabilitation  component  was  divided  into  enterprise
level  diagnostic  studies  and the  development  of specific  enterprise  related
action  plans. Concrete  measures  for  reform  implementation  were expected  to
flow  from  the  data  generated  through  these  conditions.
Execution  and  completion  of a reform  measure  were  made  a condition
in cases  where  the institutional  reform  was (a)  relatively  easy  to carry
out  becas  e the  country  had  progressed  to the  point  of reform  in its  own
policies  or (b)  was  relatively  simple. In the  industry  SECALs,  this
approach  was  used  where  legal  reforms  were involved. It  was felt  that  in
Zambia  and  Tunisia,  the  governments  were ready  to  go ahead  with legislation
on  a  new  investment  code.  The  enactment  of  the  new measure  was  tantamount
to implementing  a reform. Under  the  Morocco  agriculture  SECAL  II,  the
considerable  impetus  given  to reorganization  and  divestiture  of sector
services  as a  part of the  earlier  Morocco  SECAL  I  helped  the  government  to
implement  fairly  complex  restructuring  measures.
A review  of the  conditionality  associated  with  the  23  agriculture
SECALs  revealed  that  in  most  cases  there  were  more  conditions  associated
with institutional  actions  than  with  policy  actions. Overall,  there  were
about  twice  as  many institutional  conditions  as  policy  conditions.  This
was  true  even  though,  to  avoid  double  counting,  both  policy  and
institutional  conditions  that  were  subject  to  phasing  were  counted  only  as
single  conditions. For  example,  under  the  Nigeria  SECAL,  fertilizer
subsidies  were to  be reduced  gradually,  by certain  percentages,  over- 27 -
several  years,  subject  to an annual  review;  this  was counted  as a single
policy  reform  condition. Under  the  Morocco  SECAL,  animal  health  services
were to  be privatized  in 20 zones  as a  condition  of  negotiations,  and  in  an
additional  20  zones  as a condition  of the  third  tranche;  this  was counted
as one  institutional  condition. This  does  not imply  that  a comparison  of
the  number  of conditions  provides  a  true  measure  of their  importance  or
weight. The  existence,  however,  of  more  conditions  dealing  with
institutional  actions  than  policy  actions  is  probably  logical  in  some
situations: institutional  reforms  when  phased  properly  are  more  specific
in  nature  than  policy  decisions,  and  it is likely  that  the  implementation
of a single  policy  reform  will  often  require  more  than  one  institutional
reform  measure.
Industry  SECALs  also  followed  a similar  pattern. In the  Tunisia
industry  SECAL,  development  banks  were  to expand  their  role  in investment
financing. The  government  had already  made  some  moves  to provide  for  risk
coverage  for  external  borrowings.  However,  much  more  needed  to  be done,
especially  with respect  to the  exchange  equalization  fund  set  up by the
government.  A detailed  study  was to  be carried  out  as a condition  in  the
SECAL  to  better  understand  the  specific  issue  of exchange  rate  risk
guarantee  with  respect  to government  action,  bank  and final  borrower
strategies. In  the  Zambia  industry  SECAL,  the  simplification  of  duty
drawback  procedures  was a  condition  - a case  of implementing  a  reform
measure.- 28 -
It is  understandable  that  many of these  operations  incorporated
vague  conditions  calling  for  "satisfactory  progress"  in implementing  the
program  as a whole,  or "adequate  progress"  in  restructuring  a particular
activity  or institution. It is  possible,  however,  that  this  conditlon  gave
additional  leverage  to the  Bank in  dealing  with some  borrower  governments.
The  Philippine  agriculture  SECAL  incorporated  seven  conditions  regarding
the  implementation  of institutional  components,  but the  language  of the
second  tranche  conditions  was  rather  weak in  comparison  with  that  of other
operations. These  conditions  called  for  "adequate  progress"  in turning
over  responsibility  to  private  entities...,  in  phasing  out  price  controls,
and in  reforming  the  sugar  commission  and  the  coconut  authority.
Meaningful  progress  on some  of these  conditions  proved  elusive. Detailed
design  of institutional  components  in  a  manner  that  permits  the
identification  of specific  actions  to  be taken  according  to  a realistic
schedule  requires  Bank  staff  resources  and  a collaborative  relationship
with the  borrower  that  are  not  always  readily  available  during  project
preparation. Some  attempts  along  these  lines  were  made  in the  Colombia  and
Nigeria  trade  SECALs  and  in  the  Madagascar  industry  SECAL. The  most
noteworthy  exception  to this  tendency  was the  two  Morocco  agriculture
SECALs,  for  which  conditionality  was  very  explicit. When  all  of the  phases
or steps  of each  component  are  counted,  there  are  a total  of 25 conditions
on institutional  components  in the  Morocco  SECALs. It is difficult  to say
whether  the  number  of conditions  was  reasonable  without  making  an in-depth
study  of the  context.- 29 -
Technical  Agsistance
Technical  assistance  (TA)  was  provided  as an integral  part of
SECALs  in  47 out  of the  55  cases. In  several  countries,  SECALs  were  able
to  piggyback  on the  technical  assistance  provided  by other  donors  or other
Bank  projects. In some  cases,  the  Bank  and  other  donors  collaborated  in
the  design  or redesign  of technical  assistance  to ensure  that  it  was
consistent  with the  needs  of the  programs. Institutional  strengthening  was
an important  objective  of  TA in  all  SECALs. TA  was  not  provided  in some
cases  where  the  government  was considered  capable  of  performing  the
required  functions. The  TA components  in SECALa  therefore  do not  tell  the
whole  story. Nevertheless,  the  volume  of  TA in  SECALs  is a  partial  measure
of the  support  a sector  received  for  studies,  training  and  other  forms  of
planning  and  implementation  assistance.  Sectors  and  regions  have  varied  in
their  share  of  TA in  SECALs. Agriculture  SECALs  devoted  2.1  percent  of the
loans  to TA,  whereas  industry  and  trade  had  TA shares  of 1.2  and  1.0
percent  respectively.  The  Asian  and  EHENA  trade  SECALs  did  not include  TA
components,  but achieved  TA through  related  investment  or  TA projects.
Given  the  diverse  sources  of  TA,  and  the  incomplete  evidence  on
the  subject  in SECAL  documents,  it  has  not  been  possible  to evaluate  the
nature,  scope  and impact  of  TA in  SECALs. This  clearly  is  an important
theme  that  warrants  a separate  study  in its  own  right.- 30  -
IV.  ImRlementation  and  Impact
Adequate  evidence  to assess  the  progress  and  impact  of the  55
SECALs  over  the  project  cycle  is  not  yet  available. Although  23 SECALs
have  been completed,  only  eight  project  completion  reports  (PCRs)  have  been
released. These  PCRs,  however,  provide  only  partial  evidence  of the  iLpact
of SECAL  institutional  reforms. The  following  assessment  on the  progress
and  problems  in implementation  is  based  on PCRs,  supervision  reports,
project  files,  and interviews  with selected  Bank  staff.
PCRs  were available  for  four  of the  agriculture  SECALs: (Brazil,
Morocco  I, Sudan  I,  and  Sudan  II);  and  for  four  trade  SECALs: (Brazil,
Costa  Rica,  Indonesia,  and  Jamaica). As expected,  a review  of these  PCRs
revealed  some  well-known  problems  as regards  institutional  aspects.
(1)  Institutional  issues  were  fresuently  a  barrier  to the
successful  implementation  of secals. In several  cases,  it  appeared  that
diagnosis  and  design  did  not take  theae  factors  into  account  adequately,
and  that  while  the  proposed  reforms  might  have  been technically  quite
simple  in  and  of themselves,  this  neglect  made  them  more  difficult  to
implement. (2)  Entrenched  political  forces  and  hostile  bureaucratic  forces
within  the  institutions  posed  a serious  problem  in some  cases. Under  the
Brazil  trade  SECAL,  an import  drawback  system  was to  be established  within
the  export  credit  agency  of  the  central  bank (CACEX)  to  benefit  exporters
who required  imported  inputs. The  project  encountered  serious  problems,  in
part  due  to the  country's  economic  difficulties,  but  also  because  of- 31  -
political  resistance  and  a  lack  of  comitment  to  the  spirit  of  the  reform
on  the  part  of  CACEX  managers.  Despite  project  guidelines  that  clearly
specifled  eligibility  criteria,  CACEX  continued  to  exercise  discretionary
power  on  what  exporters  could  import  under  the  drawback  system,  and  the
system  never  achieved  the  planned  automaticity.  (3)  Lack  of  capacity  to
fieuent  the  project  was  another  comon  problem.  Under  the  Jamaica  trade
SECAL, an  export  development  fund  was  to  be  administered  by  the  Jamaican
Export  and  Credit  Insurance  Corporation  (JECIC).  JECIC,  as an
organizatlon,  did  not  have  the  necessary  skills,  and  could  not  recruit
qualified  staff,  given  its  weak  incentive  structure.
Other  problems  highlighted  in  PCRs are  also  found  in  supervision
reports  and  are  discussed  below.  A review  of  the  implementation  problems
of  institutional  reforms  encountered  during  supervision  reveals  a  mixed
picture.  In  a  few  SECALs the  progress  was  substantial  and  implementation
problems  minimal.  In  most  cases,  conditions  for  the  release  o. tranches
have  been  met. Table  5  provides  a subjective  assessment  (based  on
supervision  reports)  of  the  progress  of  SECALs  under  implementation.  Data
on  high  qnd  low  intensity  SECALs  are  given  separately. 8 In  general,  more
low  intensity  SECALs  made  good  progress  (30%)  than  the  high  intensity
SECALs  (14%).  Over  a fifth  of  all  SECALs  encountered  serious  problems  of
implementation.  Some  were  severely  delayed,  and  in  some  cases,  reforms
which  had  been  implemented  were  not  sustained.  But  the  majority  of  both
types  of SECALs  experienced  a  variety  of  problems  in  the  course  of
implementation.  The  most  important  and  comon  problems  are  summarized
below:
j/ See  footnote  6  on  p. 22  for  a  definition  of  high  and  low  intensity
SECALS.- 32  -
Table  5
IMPLEMENTATION  OF INSTITUTIONAL  COMPONENTS
Good  Mixed  Limited  Progress/
Progress Progressi!  Rescission
High  Intensity  Secals
Agriculture
CAR  1836  X
Kenya  1717  X
Hadagascar  1691  X
Nigeria  2345  X
Sierra  Leone  1501  X
Somalia  1711  X
Uganda  1328  X
Zambia  1545  X
Philippines  2469  X
Morocco  I 2590  X
Morocco  II 2885 .
Tunisia  2754  X
Turkey  2585  X
Brazil  2348  _
Brazil  2727  X
Uruguay  2468  X
j/  Good  progress  on some  but  not  all  components.
2/  Project  not  effective  as  of 6/88.- 33 -
Table  5  (cont'd)
IMPLEMENTATION  OF INSTITUTIONAL  COMPONENTS
Good  Mixed  Limited  Progress*
Progress  Progress
High  Intensity  Secals  (cont'd.)
Ghana  1435  X
Ghana  1573  X
Nigeria  2758  X
Zambia  2391  X
Pakistan  2701  X
Bolivia  1703  X
Bolivia  1828  X
Colombia  2677  X
Costa  Rica 2274  X
Jamaica  2320  X
Mexico  2331  X
Industr=
Bangladesh  1816  X
Ghana  1672  X
Hungary  2700  X
Madagascar  1834  X
Morocco  2604  x
Tunisia  2781  X
Zambia  1630  x
*  Also  includes  loans/credits  rescinded.- 34 -
Table  5 (cont'd.)
IMPLEMENTATION  OF INSTITUTIONAL  COMPONENTS
Good  Mixed  Limited  Progress
Progress  Progress
Low  Intensity  Secals
Agriculture
Burkina  1550  X
Malawi  1352  X
Sudan  I  1000  X
Sudan  II  1389  X
Sudan  III  1866  X
Argentina  2675  X
Ecuador  2626  X
Trade
Ghana  1393  X
Guinea  Bissau  1531
Zimbabwe  2239  X
Indonesia  2780  X
Argentina  2815  X
Brazil  2347  X
Colombia  2551  X
Jamaica  2848  X
Mexico  2745  X
Industry
Korea  2571  X
Madagascar  1541  X
Mauritius  2791  X
Morocco  2377  X
Zaire  1708  X- 35 -
1.  Conditionality  vs.  Follow-up  Actions
Supervision  reports  show  that  in  many  cases  the  problem  was  not
with  meeting  the  conditions  of the  SECAL, 9 but  with the  follow-up  actions
essential  to the  success  of the  institutional  reforms. For  example,  an
action  plan for  the  rehabilitation  of  public  enterprises  was  prepared  in
Zambia,  thus  meeting  a condition  of the  SECAL. But  the  holding  company
responsible  for  the  program  could  not  actively  follow  up and  make it
effective. An Economic  Evaluation  Unit  was set  up  by the  Government  of
Zambia  as a condition  of the  credit,  but the  unit  did  not  function  well as
it  did  not enjoy  a  key  role  in the  planning  organization.  In  Hungary,  a
restructuring  program  office  was set  up  s  required  by the  SECAL,  but
supervision  reports  confirmed  that  restructuring  was  not  fully  understood
by the  Ministry  of Industry  staff. The  post-appraisal  report  for  the
Hungary  industry  SECAL  II (Oct.-Nov.'86)  noted  the  following: "Supply
response  of enterprises  to the  program  has  been  uneven  and  disappointing...
enterprise  behavior  does  not  reflect  pressures  for  the  efficiency  and
financial  discipline  intended  to  be achieved  through  specific  measures  of
the  program." A soft  budget  constraint  and  lack  of competition  no doubt
contributed  to this  outcome.
2.  Complexitv  of  Reform
In general,  SECALs  are  not  an  effective  vehicle  for  implementing
complex  institutional  reforms  when  the  countries  involved  have  weak
2/ Although  tranche  conditions  were  often  met  with  delays.- 36  -
institutional  capacities.  In several  cases,  the  simpler  institutional
reforms  were implemented  while  little  progress  was  observed  in  the
implementation  of the  more  com2lex  and  oolitically  sensitive  reforms. As
noted  earlier,  procedural  reforms  have  been  easier  to implement  than  long-
term  capacity  building  measures,  and,  as expected,  organizational
strengthening  enjoyed  greater  progress  than  organizational structurLng.
Thus  the  strengthening  of existing  organizations  or improving  specific
organizational  functions  were easier  to accomplish  than  the  reorganization
or divestiture  of  public  agencies  which  threatened  important  political,
labor  or  bureaucratic  interests. In  trade  SECALs,  it  was relatively  easy
to  set  up export  information  systems  or to improve  specific  functions  like
accounting  and  procurement  in  export  agencies. Organizational
restructuring  turned  out  to  be more  difficult, both  because  of the
tendency  to (1)  overestimate  the  implementation  capacity  of sector
institutions  as in the  early  years  of the  Bolivia  and  Ghana  trade  SECALs
under  which  sub-sector  corporations  were  to  be reorganized,  and (2)
underestimate  the  complexity  of  the  reform  itself  as  in  many  Sub-saharan
African  countries  with  weak institutional  capacities.
A case  in  point  is  the  restructuring  of the  state-owned  Cocoa
Board  and  the  timber  and  mining  corporations  which  ran  into  severe  problems
in the  second  year of the  Ghana  trade  SECAL. The  complexity  of the  reform
was  underestimated  and  led  to  unexpected  delays.
"The  restructuring  exercise  has  been  under  way  for  two  years,  much
longer  than  planned  due  to  the  attention  given  to  reviewing  all
the  files  of COCOBOD's  75,000  plus  staff. The  program  of laying
off  400  senior  staff  on October  31,  1985  and  some  16,000  junior- 37 -
staff  on  November  30,  1985  was  progressing  on schedule. However,
on  October  30,  the  government  stopped  COCOBOD  from  putting  the
program  into  effect  due  to  disagreements  within  the  government  on
the  timing  of the  payment  to  redundant  staff."  (Supervision
Report,  November  1985).
There  was considerable  progress  with the  Cocoa  Board  reforms  subsequently
in spite  of the  formidable  initial  difficulties  which  were  both  political
and  organizational  in  nature.
Similarly,  under  the  Nigerian  agriculture  SECAL, the  technical
efficiency  of  fertilizer  procurement  by an agency  of the  Federal  Ministry
of  Agriculture  was improved,  but  the  divestiture  of fertilizer  procurement
and  distribution  by the  ministry  and its  transfer  to  a commercial  state
enterprise  located  in the  Federal  Ministry  of Industry,  was  not implemented
as expected,  and  economic  inefficiencies  persisted. In this  case,
political  res;.stance  due  to a  potential  loss  of  power  and  patronage  as a
result  of the  reorganization  was  a serious  concern  for  the  agricultural
ministry.
3.  Inadeauate  Institutional  Diagnosis
Progress  was  hampered  in  some  SECALs  by a  Poor  diagnosis  of
institutional  issues  and  the  consequent  inadequacies  of project  design.
For  example,  when  the  assessment  of local  capacity  is  neglected  or is
poorly  done,  wrong  assumptions  are likely  to  be made  as to the  reforms  a
government  or other  local  agencies  can  accomplish.  In the  Uruguay
agriculture  SECAL,  the  assumption  was  made  that  the  credit/extension  agency
was  capable  of  providing  improved  extension  to the  crop  subsector,  though- 38 -
its  prior  experience  was only  in  the  livestock  sector. One  objective  of
the  project  was to  encourage  diversification  in  agriculture  by extending
credit  and  extension  services  to the  crop  sector  in  addition  to  the  more
traditionally  favored  livestock  sector. To attain  this  objective,
conditionality  required  that  the  government  increase  the  budget  of the
extension  agency. The  government  met this  condition,  but  the  effort
appears  to  have  been compromised  by the  agency's  lack  of flexibility  to
reallocate  funds  among  the  extension  service's  functional  categories.
The  Costa  Rica  trade  SECAL  was  reasonably  successful  in its  policy
thrust  of promoting  non-traditional  exports  to  non-CACM  countries. The
SECAL  paved  the  way for  a SAL  as originally  anticipated.  On the
institutional  side,  the  loan  served  to  set  up an export  dave.lopment  unit,
FOPEX,  which  administered  the  revolving  fund. FOPEX  performed  reasonably
well.  There  were,  however,  problems  with  respect  to the  TA component.
Although  the  SECAL  had reviewed  the  functioning  of the  various  agencies
involved  in  exports,  it  was felt  that  a more  thorough  diagnosis  of these
agencies  might  have  led  to  better  design  of TA.
Along  the  same  lines,  in  the  Mexican  trade  SECAL,  the  Supervision
Report  of  October  1984 (about  a year  and  a half  after  the  start  of the
project)  observed  that  "the  concrete  results  of the  export  development
programs  have so far  been rather  limited,  mainly  because  of the  For£ian
Trade  Institute's  limited  capability  to  promote  them  adequately  within  the
government,  the  banking  community  and  among  potential  investors/exports."
The  question  of  providing  adequate  institutional  support  for  export- 39 -
financing  could  also  have  been given  greater  attention  during  project
preparation.  Needless  to  say,  diagnosis  contributes  jointly  with other
factors  to implementation  success. Morocco  Agriculture  SECAL  I testifies
to the  importance  of careful  institutional  diagnosis  and  to the  value  of
the  exercise  as a collaborative  effort  between  the  Bank  and  the  borrower
government.
4.  Impact  of  lacroeconomic  Disorder
In some  cases,  the  persistent  macroeconomic  disorder  and  the
weaknesses  of  macro-policy  institutions  adversely  affected  SECAL
implementation,  a  problem  also  noted  by some  PCRs. This  was  particularly
true  of agriculture  SECALs  which  were  among  the  first  policy-based
operations  in  some  countries. SECALs  were  frequently  introduced  as a first
step  in the  reform  process,  particularly  when  the  government  was  not  ready
to  undertake  more  comprehensive  macroeconomic  reforms. This  proved  to  be a
useful  strategy  in  some  cases,  but  occasionally  macroeconomic  disorder,  and
the  weakness  of  macroeconomic  institutions,  undermined  the  operations  that
were  examined. Under  the  Somalia  agriculture  SECAL,  in  order  to overcome
an overvalued  official  exchange  rate,  the  government  established  a
(limited)  foreign  exchange  auction  for  allocating  the  proceeds  of the
SECAL. The auction,  which  was  managed  by the  central  bank  with guidance
provided  by the  IMF  resident  representative,  worked  well  for  about  12
months. Most  of the  other  components  of the  SECAL  were  progressing  well.
Then,  on the  advice  of the  IMF,  but  without  consulting  the  World  Bank,  the
government  expanded  the  auction  to  include  all  foreign  exchange  operations.- 40  -
Due in  part to  weak  credit  controls  in  the  central  bank,  foreign  exchange
reserves  deteriorated  sharply. The  government  reacted  by cancelling  the
auction,  and  without  this  mechanism  for  disbursal,  the  SECAL  was suspended.
Similarly,  the  Sudan  agriculture  SECALs  provided  foreign  exchange
for  the  Sudanese  agricultural  export  sector. Under  both  operations  the
government  was  expected  to  develop  a  plan  for  ensuring  the  future
availability  of  foreign  exchange  for  the  sector,  but  was  not  able  to  do  so.
The  government  was  also  unable  to  establish  effective  debt  management.  It
proved  very  difficult  to resolve  these  macroeconomic  issues  in the  context
of  a  SECAL.
Macroeconomic  problems  did  not,  however,  cause  institutional
reforms  to fail  in  all  cases. Thus,  in the  Zambia  trade  SECAL  the  internal
management  of the  Copper  Corporatien  was  improved  in  spite  of a difficult
macroeconomic  context. The  narrow  scope  of the  reform,  the  commitments
already  made,  and  the  ease  of focusing  on a single  key  enterprise  may  have
facilitated  the  reform  implementation.
5.  Inter-Ministerial  Coordination  Problems
The implementation  of institutional  reforms  was delayed  in several
cases  by internal  coordination  problems  when  multiple  ministries  were
involved  in  SECALs. This  was  a special  problem  in  trade  SECALs  whose
design  envisaged  multi-agency  cooperation.  Virtually  all  trade  SECALs
called  for  inter-ministerial  coordination  and  about  half of agriculture- 41 -
SECALs  required  such  coordination.  Among  the  latter,  the  Kenya  SECAL  which
involved  six  different  ministries  did face  serious  problems  of coordination
similar  to those  of the  trade  SECALs. The  Morocco  a  -ulture SECAL  which
was successful  in  many respects,  also  suffered  from  the  problem  of
interministerial  coordination.
A striking  aspect  of trade  SECALs  was the  difficulty  in  defining
who exactly  the  client  was.  Many  departments  and  ministries  of the
goverrment  were involved  in  the  reforms  and  it  was  often  not  quite  clear  as
to  which  agency  would  be the  focal  point  for  carrying  out  the  reforms. The
administration  of the  more  traditional  sectors  in  these  countries
(agriculture,  industry)  was organized  in  the  conventional  manner  of
sectoral  bureaucracies.  Donors  were  also  used to  working  with sectorally
organized  ministries. On the  other  hand,  the  trade  function  in  many
countries  had gained  particular  attention  only  recently  because  of the  need
to  correct  the  balance  of  payments  situation.  Unlike  agriculture  or
industry,  trade  related  functions  were  usually  functionally  organized  under
the  Finance,  Industry  or Commerce  Ministries. Trade  also  involved  and
affected  quite  a few  other  agencies  of government.  Because  of all  of these
factors,  it  was difficult  to  pin down  just  who  and  which  agency  would  take
on the  full  responsibility  for  the  many  developmental  activities  of the
SECAL.
The difficulty  of  not dealing  with  a well  defined  client  was
evident  in the  case  of the  Colombia  trade  SECAL. The  sectoral  objective  of
the  loan  was to support  the  first  phase  of the  government's  trade  policy- 42 -
adjustment  program. Supervision  missions  had  to deal  with  several  arms  of
the  government  during  their  visits. As a  project  officer  observed:
"There  was  no interlocutor  for  the  Bank  team  during  our  visits.
It so  happened  that  there  was  an interested  chief  of a trade-
related  agency  which  was important  for  the  implementation  of some
of the  reforms. But  she  was transferred  and  the  next  one  was  not
so interested  in sustaining  the  changes. We moved  from  ministers
to  heads  of agencies  to  others. The  Bank  had  no one  person  or
agency  to link  up with  for  this  project."
In Costa  Rica,  the  Ministry  of Finance,  Ministry  of  Export  and
Investment,  Ministry  of Economy  and  Commerce,  and  the  Central  Bank  were the
principal  agencies  involved  in trade. In  addition,  a semi-autonomous
agency  called  CENPRO  was directly  involved  in  export  promotion  policies.
The revolving  fund  that  was to  be set  up through  the  SECAL  was located,  to
begin  with,  in the  Central  Bank. The  Ministry  of Export  and  Investment  and
CENPRO  were to  coordinate  studies. In spite  of the  plethora  of agencies  in
Costa  Rica,  a  project  official  observed  that  "a  central  coordinating  point
for  trade  was still  lacking." Towards  the  end  of the  SECAL,  there  was talk
of a  managing  committee  in  the  office  of  presidency  to  work  on trade
matters,  pushing  the  coordination  to  a  higher  level.
In the  agricultural  sector,  the  Brazil  SECAL  was  different  from
most SECALs  in that  it did  not  deal  with  the  country's  agricultural
institutions  Der  se,  but rather  with its  financial  and  trade  policies  and
institutions.  Moreover,  according  to a  project  officer,  the  Ministry  of
Agriculture  was  strictly  a technical  agency  and  had  no policy  capacity  or
responsibility,  particularly  in the  matters  covered  by this  SECAL. In- 43 -
fact,  it  was  not  clear  as to  who  should  - the  Bank's  primary  interlocutor
for  the  project. This  is in  part  a  problem  of the  project  design  not
having  been  adapted  well to the  institutional  reality  of the  country. In
addition,  there  were  two  changes  of government  since  the  project  was
initiated. Originally,  Bank  staff  dealt  with  the  Ministry  of Plan,  which
was subsequently  subsummed  under  the  Ministry  of  Finance. Though  it  was
recently  reestablished,  it  st'll  has severe  staff  inadequacies.  In the
meantime,  the  Bank  continues  to deal  with  the  Special  Office  of Economic
Affairs  of the  Ministry  of Finance.
6.  Inadeguate  Attention  to Implementation  Processes
The  implementation  difficulties  faced  by institutional  reforms
were in some  cases  due  to a lack  of attention  to the  processes  for  getting
things  done.  In  part,  this  is  a problem  of  design  which  tends  to  specify
the "end  states"  to  be achieved,  but  ignores  the  requirements  of the
"transition"  or the  steps  needed  to  get  from  the  starting  point  to the  end.
It  also  sheds  light  on the  limits  of the  supervision  process. Often
organizational  structure  or the  creation  of a new  agency  receives  much
attention,  but the  processes  required  to  make  them  perform  are  neglected.
A case in  point  is the  Sierra  Leone  agriculture  SECAL  which  involved  the
reorganization  of agricultural  institutions,  including  a change  in the
relationship  between  provincial  agencies  and  the  central  ministry. In
order  to decentralize  decision  making  in  the  context  of a  unified  national
organization,  a chief  regional  officer  (CRO)  would  be appointed  in  each  of
the  country's  six  regions. The  CRO  and  his  division  chiefs  were  to  become- 44  -
a  management  team  at the  regional  level. This  arrangement  was  to replace
the  previously  centralized  management  under  which  all  division  chiefs
reported  directly  to technical  authorities  in  the  miiistry. The  design
documents  dealt  with  the  necessary  changes  in  processes  that  this
structural  change  implied: for  example,  regular  communications  and
meetings  of the  regional  management  teams  were  specified. However,  in
practice,  only  the  structure  of the  organization  was changed;  decision-
making  processes  and  the  entrenched  bureaucratic  culture  remained  largely
unaltered. Such  changes  obviously  require  a great  deal  more  effort  and
commitment  on the  part  of the  government,  and  more  specialized  supervision
and  attention  on the  part  of the  Bank  than  have  been available. Process
changes  also  require  more  time  than  changes  in  organizational  structure.
The  project  as originallv  designed  was  too  ambitious,  and  was  redesigned  in
M(ay  1987. Unfortunately,  disbursements  have  been suspended  due  to  the
government's  failure  to  pay  the  Bank's  service  charges,  so it ii  not
possible  to  determine  whether  the  redesigned  project  will  be successful.
The  experience  of the  Nigerian  trade  SECAL  reinforces  this  lesson.
The  SECAL  required  the  establishment  of a  monitoring  unit.  The  Unit  was
set  up in the  Division  of External  Finance,  Ministry  of Finance. A
competent  chief  was  appointed,  but  as in the  case  of  Pakistan's  Industrial
Incentives  Reform,  recruitment  of £taff  was less  satisfactory,  The  Unit
was  successful  in  putting  together  a  useful  monthly  report. The  next  phase
of  development  would  have  had  to  ensure  improvements  in  the  quality  and
thoroughness  of  data  collected.  It  would  also  have  to  ensure  that  users  of
information  supplied  by the  Monitoring  Unit  make  good  use  of the  data  and- 45  -
insist  on  better  quality. In  other  words,  each  sequence  of  an effort  to
develop  an institutional  mechanism  for  capacity  building  appeared  to  need
special  attention  to  the  organizational  processes  involved.
V.  Conclusion
This  paper  has  reviewed  the  institutional  reforms  in 55  of the  65
SECALs  approved  by the  Bank  during  fiscal  1983-87. They  include  SECALs  in
agriculture,  trade,  and industry,  but  exclude  thoee  pertaining  to  education
and  public  enterprises.  The  focus  of the  review  was  on the  analysis  of the
institutional  issues  addressed  and  the  institutional  reforms  adopted  by
SECALs,  and  their  experience  with  respect  to  the  implementation  of  reforms.
Three  important  categories  of  institutional  issues  were  discussed
in  the  SECALs under  review.  First,  organizational  and  managerial
deficiencies  of sector  institutions  were  considered  a  major  constraint.
Seco , a  variety  of regulatory  and  procedural  constraints  had to  be
eliminated  in  order  to  enable  governments  to  implement  the  SECAL  policy
reforms.  Tlhrd,  the  policy  analytic  and  planning  capability  within  sector
ministries  and  other  public  agencies  seemed  to  be too  weak to  sustain  the
poliey  reform  process  initiated  by  the  SECALs.
The  institutional  reforms  designed  to  deal  with  these  issues  in
the  SECALs were threefold: (1)  Organizational  restructuring  and
strengthenin.  measures. Restructuring  covered  a  wide spectrum  of reforms- 46 -
which  includes  the  divestiture  of  public  agencies  or functions  and the
reorganization  of existing  activities.  Organizational  strengthening
consisted  of the  improvements  achieved  through  leadership  changes,
induction  of competent  personnel,  new systems  and  practices  and  training.
(2)  Regulatory  and  procedural  reforms. The  rationalization  of the  sector's
regulations  and  procedures  was  a necessary  reinforcement  to the  SECALs'
policy  reforms. In  some  instances,  changes  in  existing  laws  were  required
to facilitate  the  implementation  of  new  policies. In  general,  the  focus
here  was on deregulation  and  procedural  improvements  and  not  on the
reorganization  of regulatory  institutions.  (3)  Sector  Dolicv  and  planning
caDacity  building. The  capacity  sought  to  be developed  through  this  type
of reform  was:  (a)  skills  to  develop  sector  strategies  and  to  monitor
sector 'erformance;  and (b)  specialized  skills  for  the  analysis  of
investments,  prices,  trade,  etc.  In some  cases,  special  units  were
proposed  to  be established  in  sector  ministries  or other  agencies  as focal
points  for  policy  analysis  and  personnel  training.
Every  SECAL  reviewed  had institutional  components  which  reflected
a  blend  of these  reforms. Most institutional  reforms  were closely  linked
to or  derived  from  the  SECAL  policy  reforms. This  was  particularly  true
for  regulatory  and  procedural  reforms  which  flowed  from  the  need  to
implement  specific  policy  reforms. The  linkage  between  policy  and
institutional  reforms  was  less  direct  when  the  latter  were  meant  to
facilitate  or strengthen  supply  response  in  the  sector  concerned.  A third
type  of institutional  reforms  (e.g.,  policy  analytic  capacity  building)  did
not  have any  direct  links  to  current  SECAL  policy  reforms  as they  were
designed  to strengthen  the  sector  over  the  long  haul.- 47 -
Of all the  institutional  reform  components,  organizational
restricturing  and  strengthening  was  the  most frequent  category,  followed  by
policy  analytic  capacity  building  and  regulatory  and  procedural  reforms.
The  scope  of theae  institutional  reforms  varied  somewhat  between  sectors
and  regions. Trade  SECALs,  which  had  a larger  share  of macroeconomic
content  in its  policy  reforms  than  other  types  of SECALs,  had institutional
reforms  which  affected  different  sectors. SECALs  for  agriculture  and
industry,  by contrast,  had fewer  multi-sectoral  institutional  reforms. The
institutional  reforms  in  agriculture  SECALs  were  designed  to improve  the
sector  ministry  as  well as field  agencies;  but  both  were  within  the  purview
of the  agriculture  sector  except  in  a few  cases. In some  cases,  the  sector
institutions  were fragmented  and  intra-sectoral  coordination  difficult  and,
in  many,  coordination  between  the  sector  ministries  and  the  core  financial
and  economic  authorities  was essential  for  the  success  of the  SECAL. In
terms  of regions,  agriculture  and  industry  SECALs  in  Africa  had  more
limited  scope  than  those  in  Asia  and  EMENA. The  IAC  SECGA1  fell  in
between. Many  of the  African  agriculture  SECALs,  for  example,  dealt  with
one  subsector  of  agriculture  at  a time  while  the  Asian  and  EMENA  SECALs
spanned  the  entire  sector. This  reflects  a useful  attempt  on the  part  of
the  Bank  staff  to  match  the  complexity  and  scope  of reform  to the
institutional  capacity  of the  countries  concerned.
Significant  differences  between  SECALs  were  observed  when  they  are
classified  by their  degree  of institutional  intensity.  A majority  of the
low  intensity  SECALs-were  found  to  be the  first  policy-based  sector  loans
in the  countries  concerned,  whereas  a  majority  of the  high  intensity  SECALs- 48 -
were  either  repeat  loans  or were  preceded  by other  SECALs  or SALs.
Furthermore,  the  diagnosis  of institutional  issues  in the  high intensity
SECALs  was  generally  more  thorough  and  systematic  than  the  diagnosis
underlying  the  low  intensity  SECALs.
As expected,  PCRs  confirm  that  institutional  issues  were
frequently  a  barrier  to the  successful  implementation  of SECALs. In  some
cases,  hostile  political  and  bureaucratic  interests  adversely  affected
reform  implementation.  Not surprisingly,  borrower's  lack  of capacity  to
implement  the  agreed  upon  reforms  also  emerged  as a  problem  in  a few
SECALs.
Adequate  evidence  does  not exist  to assess  the  impact  or  outcome
of the  SECAL  institutional  reforms. An initial  review  of their
implementation  experience,  however,  shows  that  while  the  conditionalities
were  met in  most  cases,  several  problems  were  encountered  in  the  course  of
supervision. In  general,  institutional  constraints  were  frequently  a
barrier  to effective  SECAL  implementation.  Low  intensity  SECALs,  however,
made  more  progress  in implementation  than  high intensity  SECALs  which  shows
that,  in  spite  of a  more  careful  diagnosis,  some  of them  were  too
ambitious. It  was found  that  the  relatively  simpler  institutional  reforms
were implemented  while  the  more  complex  and  politically  sensitive  reforms
faced  severe  problems. Thus  the  si;rengthening  of existing  organizations  or
improving  specific  organizational  functions  were  easier  to  accomplish  than
the  reorganization  or divestiture  of  public  agencies  which  threatened
-i
important  political,  labor  or  bureaucratic  interests. In some  cases,  the- 49 -
persistent  macroeconomic  disorder  and  the  weaknesses  of macro-policy
institutions  adversely  affected  SECAL  implementation.  Inadequate
institutional  diagnosis  and  consequent  design  weaknesses  also  seem  to  have
contributed  to implementation  problems. Often  organizational  structure  and
staff  competence  in limited  technical  areas  proved  easy  to improve,  but
changes  in  organizational  processes  and  bureaucratic  culture  were  difficult
to design  and  implement.
Technical  assistance  (TA)  was  provided  for  in  most  of the  SECALs.
Their  nature  and  scope,  however,  were  not  examined  in  this  review  as the
full  evidence  on  TA was  not  readily  available. This  subject  deserves
careful  study  as TA is an important  aid  to the  implementation  of
institutional  reforms.
Imolications  for  Bank  Policy
1)  The  importance  of a careful  diagnosis  of the  sectoral
institutional  framework  cannot  be overemphasized.  The  problem  is  less
severe  in  sectors  like  agriculture  where  past  project  and  sector  work  has
led  to  a better  understanding  of sector  institutions. 10 A mapping  of the
IQ/  This  does  not imply  that  those  who  diagnose  institutional  problems  well
necessarily  design  better  or  more appropriate  reforms. The  ability  to
generate  imaginative  options  for  reform  and  to choose  those  which  fit
the  context  best is independent  of  diagnostic  skills.- 50 -
relevant  institutions  concerned  with sector  policy,  sector-wide  management,
sector-wide  support  services  and  field  operations  should  be a starting
point  in  all SECALs,  even  in those  which  do  not  plan  to  undertake  major
institutional  reforms. To the  extent  they  are  followed  by other  SECALs
with  higher  intensity,  an early  start  in the  initial  SECALs  provides  a
longer  lead  time  to  understand  the  key issues  and  to  develop  a consensus
within  the  government  on the  diagnosis  and  on the  needed  reforms. The  set
of institutions  to  be analyzed  will  clearly  vary  with  the  thrust  of the
SECAL  objectives  and  reforms. Attention  to institutional  diagnosis  and
design  assumes  special  importance  in  SECALs  in  view  of their  quick
disbursing  nature  and  the  limited  time  available  for  redesign. Where  a
series  of SECALs  are  planned,  there  is  clearly  greater  flexibility  for
redesign.
2)  Much of the  institutional  diagnosis  done  for  SECALs  focuses  on an
assessment  of the  capacity  of sector  institutions  in  their  substantive
(technical)  areas  of  work. An assessment  of the  interest  groups  affected
by the  reforms  and  the  risks  they  pose  for  implementation  is  conspicuous  by
its  absence. Inputs  from  middle  level  bureaucrats  on the  appropriateness
and  feasibility  of reform  are  certainly  useful. But  an assessment  of the
capacity  of top  level  leaders  to  mobilize  support  for  reform  and  resist
opposing  forces  is  also  important.  A proper  diagnosis  must  be a mix  of
both  and  grounded  in  a solid  understanding  of local  problems. A joint
diagnostic  exercise  is  more likely  to  yield  a good  mix  of technical,
organizational  and  political  analysis,  and  to  provide  a  better  basis  for -
assessing  "implementation  feasibility.'- 51  -
As noted  above,  identification  of the  relevant  institutions  and
institutional  issues  is  a  precondition  for  institutional  diagnosis. Policy
reforms  will  be a  useful  point  of departure  in this  regard. There  are  some
institutional  reforms  which  directly  follow  from  policy  reform  (e.g.,
regulatory  and  procedural  reforms). They  will  point  to  certain  public
agencies  whose  systems  and  practices  may  need  to  be assessed  and  modified.
Some  policy  reforms  will  call  for  institutional  reinforcement  on the  supply
response  side. In this  case,  the  focus  will  be on institutions  which  are
critical  to supply  response  (e.g.,  extension  agencies  in agriculture  or
credit  institutions).  When  policy  reforms  entail  the  divestiture  of  public
enterprises  or other  public  services,  the  diagnosis  should  focus  on the
government's  capacity  to  get  this  task  done  and  on the  strengths  and
weaknesses  of the  private  sector  in  responding  to  the  reform. Thus  the
nature  and  scope  of policy  reforms  will  provide  useful  directions  for
institutional  diagnosis.
When institutional  issues  and  constraints  are  self  evident  or  can
easily  be  delineated,  it  will  be  in  order  to  analyze  them  in  a  standard,
technical  fashion  (e.g.,  through  the  use  of  interviews,  analysis  of
documents,  statistics,  etc.). When,  however,  there  is  much  ambiguity  about
the  issues  involved  and  reasonable  people  differ  as to their  causes,  it  is
important  to adopt  a "process  approach"  to institutional  diagnosis.  There
is a case  here for  generating  the  diagnosis  by bringing  together  the
different  actors  or stakeholders  whose  perceptions  of the  problems  will  be
critical  to a  balanced  assessment  of the  basic  institutional  issues
involved. Since  the  implementation  of the  reforms  likely  to  be proposed- 52  -
will  require  their  support,  it is  equally  important  that  the  diagnostiL
process  also  acts  as a consensus  building  exercise  or at least  contributes
to an appreciation  among  the  key  participants  of differing  perceptions  of
the  problems. Workshops,  taskforces,  etc.  are  useful  instruments  to
achieve  this  goal.
It is  equally  important  that  institutional  diagnosis  is  carried
out  as  a  joint  exercise  with  the  country  concerned.  The  contextual  roots
and  nuances  of institutional  issues  cannot  be over-emphasized  and  their
diagnosis  will seldom  be easy  for  outsiders  (especially  short-term
visitors)  except  in fairly  simple  cases. Joint  diagnosis  is important  also
for  creating  a sense  of  ownership  of and  commitment  within  the  country  to
the  ensuing  results. Local  expertise  should  be actively  sought  in the
diagnostic  process  and  wherever  possible,  external  advisors  should  play  a
facilitative  rather  than  lead  role  in  it.
Institutional  diagnosis  is  never  complete  without  an  assessment,
implicit  or explicit,  of the  capacity  and  will  of the  relevant  leaders  to
support  reforms. The  starting  point  here  has to  be the  identification  of
the  leaders  who are  likely  to  be critical  to the  reform  process. Second,
they  need  to  be appraised  of the  proposed  institutional  tasks  and  their
full  implications.  Third,  it  is  necessary  to ascertain  (formally  or
informally)  the  extent  to  which  they  are  ready  to  allocate  the  required
resources  (financial  and  human)  for  the  proposed  reforms. This is the  only
way to determine  the  priority  they  are  likely  to accord  to  the  reforms.
Fourth,  their  responses  need  to  be informally  cross-checked  with other
stakeholders  including  bureaucrats  for  their  realism. These  are  essential- 53  -
steps  in  the  diagnostic  process  even  when  an open  and  extended  official
discussion  of the  issues  involved  is ruled  out  for  political  reasons.
3)  When  complex  institutional  reforms  are  proposed,  there  is  merit  in
sequencing  them  so  as to improve  the  chances  of implementatiLn  success.
This  will reduce  the  scope  of the  reforms,  problems  of  coordination,  and
the  intensity  of threats  from  affected  interest  groups. For  example,
restructuring  of organizations  in  several  subsectors  simultaneously  could
become  unmanageable  for  the  reasons  given  above. But in  a difficult
context,  if one  subsector  at a time  is  taken,  implementation  will tend  to
be  easier  and  the  learning  could  be used  to  better  plan  the  restructuring
of other  subsectors.  The  choice  of the  initial  subsector  should  be
governed  by criteria  such  as the  urgency  of its  problems  and  government's
commitment  and  willingness  to  allocate  resources  to  deal  with  them.
4)  If,  however,  a simultaneous  attack  on  multiple  institutional
fronts  is considered  necessary,  a strategic  approach  to the  reform
implementation  must  be planned. This  means  getting  the  full  support  of the
top  leaders  who alone  can influence  or control  the  relevant  actors,  and
planning  for  team  building  and "organizational  development"  to  ensure
effective  implementation.  Greater  attention  should  be given  to the
organizational  processes  at  work during  supervision  so as to  detect
problems  early  and  to  ensure  continued  support  to  the  reform  at  all  levels.
Ideally,  what  is  required  is  to  create  opportunities  for  the  relevant  teams
to  get  together  with resource  persons,  if  necessary,  to sort  out  problems- 54 -
periodically  and to  reinforce  the  team  building  process. Supervision
missions  can  support  this  effort  by organizing  small  group  meetings  or
workshops  to review  the  progress  and  problems  on the  institutional  front.
This  w:'ll  facilitate  the  early  identification  of problem  areas  and  speed  up
remedial  action. Setting  up a  monitoring  unit  or an implementation
authority  in  a ministry  is  no substitute  for  the  strategic  interventions
proposed  above.
5)  The  design  of most  institutional  reform  components  is  admittedly
more difficult  than  that  of economic  policy  reforms  though  getting  a
consensus  on the  latter  is  not  always  easy. This  is  because  in  some  SECAL
contexts,  reforms  cannot  always  be precisely  specified  too  early  in  the
project  cycle  and  the  sequence  of steps  involved  cannot  be predicted  with
certainty. The  design  process  thus  assumes  special  importance.  The  manner
in  which  design  ideas  are  generated,  the  commitment  of the  national
counterparts  to the  agreed  upon  design  and  an assessment  of their  capacity
to  monitor  and  adapt  design  components  over  time  are  critical  elements  of
this  process. Staif  who are  unfamiliar  with  these  process  issues  are
likely  to focus  more  on the  creation  of formal  structures,  studies,
technical  assistance  and  budget  allocations  as the  key  elements  of the
design. An obvious  answer  to this  problem  is  to draw  upon  expert  and
experienced  personnel  (local  or foreign)  to  deal  with these  issues  during
the  preparation  phase. Since  this  may  be infeasible  in  some  contexts,
another  alternative  is  to sensitize  staff  on these  issues,  using,  for
example,  well  documented  case  studies  of  good  designs  and  the  processes
(formal  and  informal)  used  during  preparation.  Much  work  remains  to  be
done  in this  area.- 55 -
In some  SECALs,  it  may  be relatively  easy to  specify  the  "end
state"  of  an institutional  reform  with  a fair  degree  of  precision. More
attention  to  detailed  design  and  phasing  will  help in  such  cases.
Sequencing  and  breaking  reforms  into  component  steps  also  helps  to  reveal
processes  which  remain  neglected  when  only  the  end-product  is  defined.
Awareness  of the  complexity  of the  reform  contributes  to greater  realism  in
specifying  the  expected  end  products. If each  reform  is  broken  down  into
component  steps  or stages,  the  borrower  has  a clearer  idea  of  what is
expected. If the  expectations  are  not  met, it  is easier  for  the  Bank  to
determine  the  extent  of the  borrower's  progress. More detailed
institutional  reform  design  will  also  permit  greater  specificity  in
conditionality.
6)  From  a long-term  perspective,  policy  analytic  capacity  within
borrower  countries  is  a prerequisite  for  sustaining  sector  adjustment  and
growth. But  building  this  capacity  deserves  more  careful  attention  than  is
currently  being  given  in SECALs. While  it is  understandable  that  reforms
with  an immediate  impact  receive  the  highest  priority  in  a crisis,  the
conventional  approach  to  policy  capacity  building  even  with repeater  loans
needs  to  be challenged.  Policy-related  capacity  building  is  a small
component  in  most  SECALs,  but requires  more  staff  intensive  supervision  and
support  than  can  be provided  through  SECALs  which  deal  with  a wide  array  of
reforms,  and  a longer-term  perspective  than  is typical  of  adjustment
operations  in general. In  order  to augment  local  policy  analytic  capacity,
innovative  interventions  including,  for  example,  new  forms  of technical
assistance  need  to  be explored  outside  the  adjustment  framework.- 56  -
Admittedly,  there  is  a case  for  supporting  some  specialized
training  of  personnel  (both  short-term  and  long-term)  through  the  medium  of
SECALS. Those  who design  SECALS,  however,  should  recognize  that  this  is  a
necessary,  but often  minor  part  of capacity  building. Some  of the  more
important  options  which  deserve  attention  are  the  following:
a)  The  leverage  provided  by adjustment  operations  could  be used  to
diagnose  the  problem  of  policy  analytic  capacity  building  and  to
agree  with  the  government  on the  strategy  and  priorities  for
capacity  building. Should  the  strengthening  of  ministry  level
capacity  receive  priority  over  the  creation  of capacity  outside  of
government?  How is  the  demand  for  policy  analysis  to  be created
and  sustained? Who  should  receive  training  and  in  what fields?
How  can  policymakers  be made  more  receptive  to  policy  advice?
Should  local  taskforces  be  used  to  generate  diagnosis  and  an
action  plan?  A  good  diagnosis  of  the  problem  and  consensus  on  the
strategy  are  likely  to  have  a  longer-term  impact  on  capacity
building  than  some  other  measures  which  may lead  to  concrete
actions  but  without  the  benefit  of a supportive  framework.
b)  When concrete  plans  are  formulated  for  capacity  building,  the
question  arises  whether  the  Bank  should  assist  the  government  in
their  implementation  or identify  and interest  other  donors  to  play
this  role  in  view  of their  greater  expertise  and  experience  in
such  work.  In  some  cases,  arranging  co-financing  for  the  work  may
also  be important.- 57 -
c)  If some  local  institutions,  including  ministries,  require  twinning
support  in the  initial  phase,  other  donors  or foreign  institutions
must  be identified  for  purposes  of collaboration.  Though  SECALS
themselves  have  a relatively  short-time  horizon,  it is  possible
that  support  to such  efforts  could  be continued  through  other  Bank
projects. In  brief,  the  leverage  of SECALs  can  be used in
different  ways to initiate  the  process  of capacity  building  and  to
generate  contextually  relevant  ideas  to sustain  the  process.- 58  -
ANNE]  1
BASIC  DATA  ON SECTOS  ADJOUISTA  C02aU  IOS
8eerd  La/Cr  Aoual  or  lapected  Operation
Co'.mtrylLnlOr  *o  Approva  l_t  Duration  Clo0  ed
Date  (US milllonr)  (as  of  6/#U)
;UM  -------------- _------------___-_--______---___--_____________________------------
AM9A
1.  lurktna  SS0  2/85  9.2  6.0  yrr
2.  Central  Afrlca  Republic  1836  71/7  22.0  2.0  yvr
3.  Keny,  1717  6/96  60.0  2.0  yre  X
4.  Madagascar  1691  5/86  60.0  3.0  yra
S.  Nalawi  1352  4163  5.0  5.0  yrr  X
6.  Nsigria  2345  9/63  250.0  3.0  yra  I
----------------- _-------------------------------------------_----.------__--__---
7.  Sierra  Lome  1501  6184  21.5  4.0  yre  1a
6.  Somlia  1711  6166  70.0  2.5  yr.
9.  Sudan  I  1000  3/60  65.0  3.0  yrr  X
10.  Sudan  II 1389  9/83  50.0  3.0  ye  A
11.  Sudan  III  1666  12/87  U5.0  2.5  yr.
12.  Uganda  1328  2/O3  70.0  6.0  yr.  X
13.  Zambia  1545  1/65  25.0  5.5  yre  X
----------------------------------------------------------------------- __----__---
a  hAlM
14.  Phlippinea  2469  9/34  150.0  2.0  yra  X
15. Morocco  I  2590  6/85  100.0  2.5  yra  X
----------------------------------------------------------------------- __----__--_
16.  Morocco  I1  2865  11/87  225.0  2.0  yr.
17.  Tundi  s  2754  9/66  150.0  1.5  yr.  X
----------------------------------------------------------------------- __----__---
1S. Turkey  2585  6/65  300.0  3.0  yr.  !/
19.  Argentina  2675  4/86  350.0  2.0  yrr  It
---------------------------------------------------------------------- __-----__---
20.  IrasLl  2348  10/83  303.0  3.5  yra  X
---------------------------------------------------------- ___----------__----__---
21.  Brasil  2727  6/86  500.0  3.0  yr3
22.  Ecuador  2626  10/85  100.0  3.5  yr
_____________________-___-----  --  - --  - --  --  - --  - --  --  - --  - --  --  - --  - --  --  - --  - -- _  - - _  _  -
23.  Uruguay  2468  8/84  60.0  2.0  yr.  X
I/  Closing  date  vas  6/88i estenuion  may  be  granted.- 59  -
ANNEX  I
2Ce  Aotua  1r  2_peted  operation
Cerv&lICr  go  Ap  e  tt  at  ClOe&d
Date  (U8  mlliesa)  (o  f  6/U)
__________________________________,__________________________________________-  - - - - - - - - - -
1.  Ohms  1672  318  35.5  4.75  yrg
--- _------------------------------------------_---_-___-------------__-------___--
2.  Isda.a.  1541  118/  60.0  3.75  ya
3.  Hmda.eser  1834  6187  96.8  2.5  yr*
--------------------------------------------------------- _-----------__------__---
4.  Mauritius  2791  4187  25.0  2.0  yt*
------------------------ _--------..----------------------------------__------__----
S.  Zaire  1708  61U  80.0  2.0  yVt  X
-------- _------------------------------------------.-------------------__----__---
6.  Zaimble 1630  1015  62.0  3.0  yes
----------------------------------------------------------------------- __----__---
7.  leagladesh  1816  6187  190.0  2.5  yvr
--------------------------------------------------------------------- __------__---
8.  Ewigery  2700  318  100.0  6.0  yrZ
----------------------------------------- _---------------------------__------__---
9.  Rova.  2371  6183  222.0  5.253 ir
------------------- _------------------------------------------------__-------__---
10.  Norocao  2377  1184  150.4  1.5  yr  X
11.  Norocco  2604  7183  200.0  2.0  yr  x
12.  TmuAla  2781  2187  150.0  2.0  yra- 60-
a^o  L  t  LSCr  Aotu  l  or  EMPOtOd  Opratlau
CmmtryniLaCr  hSo  An-oval  Aiaut  DuratioL  Cleot
Date,  (U#  Millions)  (as  of  0*00)
1.  Whana 1393  0*03  40.0  2.75  y,r  S
2.  Olma,  1435  1I04  40.1  5.0  atr
3.  Chana  1573  9103  102.9  3.25  yra
4.  Cuinea  Bissau  1331  121*4  15.0  4. 0  yt
5.  igetria  2758  10t  4532.0  5.75 Itr
6.  Z  a=  2391  3*0  75.0  4.5  ptr
7.  ZL abawo  2239  2103  70.0  4.5  pta  X
0.  IvA__oona  2700  21*7  300.0  1.0  pr  x
----------- _--------,-.-------------------------------------------------__---__--
9.  Pakistan  2701  51t  70.0  2.5  yrp
------- _-------------------------------------------------------------__------__---
10.  Argentina  2015  5/07  500.0  1.0  tr  X
It.  lolivIa  1703  5*10  55.0  3.0  ytr
12.  Bolivia  1020  0107  47.1  3.0  tes
13.  Brazil  2347  91U3  352.0  4.25  It  X
14.  Colombia  2551  5Si5  300.0  3.0  yts  I
________________.  __________.____________________________________.__.__.___________
13.  Colombia  2677  4*10  250.0  2.75  yrI
16.  Costs  Ric, 2274  5,83  25.2  2.5  yts  X
----------------------------------------------------------------------- __----__---
17.  JamaIsc  2320  Gi3  30.1  3.5  yrp  X
18.  Jamalca  2848  6187  40.0  1.5  yrt
19.  Meriao  2331  6/83  350.0  6.0  yes
20.  Mexico  2745  7186  500.0  2.25  yra- 61  -
Sequeoe  of  L.  and  lecales  Percentage  of  Secal*  in  each  Sector
that  re  first  policy-basd  operaticn,  percentage  precedd  by  SL,
Seal  or  UP.  percea  t  folloved  by  MAL,  $ecl  or  UP.1
Sequene  First  Preceded  by  Preceded  by  Pollove  by  bollwed  by  Followed  by
PolLoy-based  SAL(s)  Secal(s)  or  Slea(s)  UP(s)  SA(s)
Sector  Operation  ZIP(s)
------------------ _----------------------_------------------__--_------------__-------------------------------
Asriaulture  35  22  43  59  9  1i
(12  seolms)
--------------------------------------------- _--------------------__---------__-------------------------------
Trade  35  25  50  A5  5  30
(20  secls)
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Industry  25  42  33  42  - 42
(12  seomls)
/I  Operations  approved  by  Soard  as  of  6186.- 62  -
ANE  3
IUSTZ!WTIOISL  IZWCU Oamwocumm  I  SiCnLS
Stre  theilng  Policy  *ad  organaetiom  Stru  nthening  *ad  Reettucturing
Pl nnina_Canace  wt  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
sect ctr  MtdetLag  &  Othr  Strength-  ReorGani-  Dyeet.  /  Creation  of
Subsector  Pub.aweetat.  Skill.  ening  nation  Vldr&Val  Nov Entitles
Strategy  Progrming
CountrylLnlCr  No  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGRICULTURE
Afria
1.  Durikna  1550  X  X  X
2.  Central  Africa  Republic  1836  X  X  X  S
---------------------------------------------------------- __-------------__--__-------------
3.  Kenya  1717  X  X  X  X  X
------------------- _-----------------------_---------_______-------------__--__--...---------
4.  Madagascar  1691  X  X
------------------------------------- _--_--------------------------------__--__-------------
5. MNlavL  1552  X  X
------------------------------------------------------------------------- __--__-------------
6.  Nigeria  2345  X  X
------------------------------ _-_----------------------------------------__--__-------------
7.  SierraL"one  1501  X  X  X  X  X
------------------------------------------------------------------------- __--__-------------
S.  Somalia  171L  x  X  X  X
------------------------------------------------------------------------- __--__-------------
9.  Sudn  I 1000  X  X  X
----------------------------------- _-------------------_____-------------__--__-------------
10.  Sudn  11 1389  X  X  X
------------------------------------------------------------------------- __--__-------------
11.  Sudan III  8166  X  X  X  X  X
------------------------------------------------------------------------- __--__-------------
12.  Uganda  1328  X  X  X  X
------------------------------------------------------------------------- __--__-------------
13.  Zambia  1545  X  X
------------------------------------- _-----------------------------------__--__-------------
14.  Phillppines  2469  X  X  X  X  X
------------------------------------------------------------------------- __--__-------------
15.  Morocco  1  2590  X  X  X  X  X  X  X
------------------------------------------------------------------------ ___--__-------------
16 Morocco  S1  28SS  X  X  X  X  X  X
----- _-------------------------------------------------------------------__--__-------------
17.  Tunisia  274  X  X  X  X  X  X  X
------------------------------------------------------------------------- __--__-------------
18.  urkey  2585  X  X  X  X  X
------------------------------------------------------------------------- __--__-------------
19.  Argentina  2675  X  X  X
------------------------------------------------------------------------- __--__-------------
20.  Brazil  2348  X  X  X  X
------------------------------------------------------------------------- __--__-------------
21.  Brasil  2727  X  X
22.  Ecuador  2626  X  X  X  X  X  X
23.  Uruguay  2468  X- 63  -
.~  ~  ~  ~  A  .1 _US!I!UTMIGL  MMOUS MOWTSN  SINC-AL-
Deor  l-ation!  * port  Iport  Procedures  PriceiSubsidy/
S  formoStreagth-  Pgoeduso  Allocatiogn  of  Tariff/Tax
Gain  of  MarDet.  Poreign  Iasbuan  Procedures
Countr,iLn/Cr  Wo  --------------------  --------------------------------------------
1.  Burkina  15350
---------------------------------------------------------------------
2.  Central  Aftlea  RepublIe  1636  X
---------------------------------------------------------------------
3.  Knya  1717  X  X  X
---------------------------------------------------------------------
. Madagascar 1691  X  X  x  S
---------------------------------------------------------------------
5.  MalawL  1352
----------------------------------------------------------------- __--
6.  NigerLa  2345  X
---------------------------------------------------------------------
7.  Sierra  Leon  1501
------------------------------------------------------------------- __
S.  Somalia  1711  X  S
--------- _-------------------------------------------------,---------
9.  Sudan  I  1000  X
---------------------------------------------------------------------
10.  Sudan  II 1389  X  X
11.  Sudan  III  1866
--------- _----------------------------------------------------------_
12.  Ugnda  1$28
------------------------------------------------------------------ __-
13.  Zmbia  1545  X
---------------------------------------------------------------------
AsilEma
14.  htilippine.  2469  X
---------------------------------------------------------------------
15.  Morocco  1  2590  X
---------------------------------------------------------------------
16.  Morocco  II  2885  X
---------------------------------------------------------------------
17.  Tunisia  2754  X
------------------------------------------ _--------------_-----------
16.  Turky  255  X
-------------------------------------------- _------------------------
LA&
19.  Argentina  2675  X
----------------------------------------- _-__------------------------
20.  Brazil  2346  X
----------------------------------------------------- _---------------
21.  rasil  2727  S  X  X  X
--------------------------------------- ___-__------------------------
22.  Zcuador 2626
23.  Uruguay  2468  X  X  X
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lANaM 3
Stgt  gtbmnma  Poley  *nt  Oggoasigtlcol  Strun  tbniva  *nd  Xeetgutturi
Sectoli  Dudgetin  a  Otbhe  stge#gth-  Usoxgaal-  Divst.  I  C:etien  of
Subseetog  Pub.rnvostst.  skills  onlas  *  tins  Vid4ze  N  Eg  2titie
Strat.sy  Wzot  rinas
CaimtrvlLnjCr  Mo  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DULS
1.  Ghana  1672  x  K  X  X
------------------------------------------------------------------------- __--__--------------
2.  Kadaemaar  1541  X  X
--------------- _---------------------------------.-----------------------___-__--------------
3.  Madeatac  1634  X  X  S  X  X
------------------------------------------------------------ _------------__--__---------_----
4.  mutLtius  2791
-------------------------------------------------------------- __-----------_____---------_--_
s.  Zaire  1708  X  I
----------------------------------------------------------------- _-------__-_-_---------------
6.  Zmbia  1630  I  X  X  X
------------------------------------------------------------------------- __--__--------------
7.  Ianglasdh  1616  x  X
S.  Hungary  2700  S  K
------------------------------------------------------------------------- __--__--------------
9.  Ktre  2571  X  X  x
-----------------------------------------.-------------------------- _---___--__------------_-
10.  DmWocco  2377
---------------- _------------------__-_-------------------------__------__---___-------------
11.  Morocco  2604  X  X  X  I
12.  Tunisia  2781  x  x
------------------ _--------------_---------------------------------------__--__--------------2  x  *099  ~~x  OL  o z.mu  it
I  I  0691  qvmo
I  I lOU  Zt
-------- _-------------------------------------------_--------------_-
:  vs  zuwwp4 
X  X  X  099z  um'u  It
-------------------------- _------__----------_-----------------------
x3  tZL  OXI  *6
--------------------------------------------- _---------------------._
Ipqgo  *3  Mg  g  *b
---------------------- _--____-___--------------_---------_-------__--
UU~5WU  pZUpuua  M  @  *Z31U
wgSx  uzOi  a  ,mou  *u
-- ___________________  -_-_---------------------------------------------
X  %  t6xg  1"  'Vt  p  .
------------ _-_---------------------_------------_---------------_---
__________--------------------------------------------------------7  --
*remX-aooq  *  ukees023p  1  f  p
IMUM"as  ;e  UDSelTv  moznltt  -1PIM242m
IS@wmiolwl  sesnomp  2-t  3aeZ  Ivol2twess
gemw  1_Boz-m  gaiw
07w  Elld
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ANNEX  3
INus?IUUCU*L  3Drm  oCWCms  is  SUCALS
Strgthbin.  Politt  a"  Oanial.tmal  Strzthenia  aW  aatruotu:i*g
Sector/  udgeting  Other  Stganth-  beogeni-  Divlt./  Creation  of
Subactor  Pub.  Ilvoat.  skills  ex1ng  ation  wldr:aw.  Now Zntities
Stratogy  Programing
CountrwILniCr  No  ----------------------------------------------------  -------------------------------------
1.  Ghana  1393  X
-_---------------------------------,-----------------_----------------__-----__----__-------_
2.  Ghana  1435  S  X  X  X
____________________________________________________________,________________________________
3.  Ghaa  1573  X  X  X  -
------------------------------ __----________-----------__-__-------------__--__--------------
4.  Guinea  Bissau  1531
-------------------------------------------- ,_-------------------__----------__-_------------
S.  Nigeria  2758  X  X  X
----------------------------- _--_----------------------------------------__--__--------------
6.  Zambia  2391  X  X  X
------------------------ _---__--_-------------------_--------------------__--__--------------
7.  Zimbabve  2239  X
-------------------------------------------- _-------------------------__-----__--------------
AsialEMEA
S.  Indoneaia  2780  X
----- _----------------------------------------------------------------__-----__--------------
9.  Pakistan  2701  X  X  X
------------------------------------------------------------------------- __--__--------------
10.  Argentina  2815
-------------------------------------------------------------- __-------------__--------------
11.  Bolivia  1703  x  x
--------------------------------------------- _-----------------------_---__--__-----_--_-----
12.  Bolivia  1828  X  X  X
13.  BrasLi  2347  X
--------------------------------------------------------.------------- __-----__--------------
14.  Colombia  2551  x
---------------------------------------------------------------------- __-----__--------------
15.  Colmbia  2677  X  X  X  X  X
16.  Costa  Rica  2274  X
17.  Jamaica  2320  X  X
18.  Jacmica  2848  X  X
19.  Naxico  2331  X  X  X
20.  Mexico  2745  XI  2~~  iL  O1Uc x  x  siii  e'i"  *61
*t@Z "ilr  *s1 ----------------- _-------------------------------------------------_
Csi?  WoI'U1  L ------------------------------------------ _------------------------_
X  X  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~SOIX  Wl"lOg  *f1
x  x  m  i23vo
------------ _--------_----------------_----------------_--------__--
SOLl  UT-llOg  'IT
----------------------------------------------------------------- __-
x  CEx  gg  .aquq-wl  o
33  *
I  X  Og  Z  3UP  I  *
'¶YOUU  3?  iismo  imaw  SOUZ  U-oa  *
-x  69  - *
----- _---------------------__-----_----------------_-_------__---___
6gZT  "evil  *9m  1
------------ __---_---__--_-----________---__--__---*_----_--__------
x~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I6  "@@11  VW"0  '
--- _------------_---.-----_-------_--_-----__--_____----.----____---
--- _-_-__---------_---  _----_----_______________________________o  -01-insu
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Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2D2  A Cross-Section  Analysis of Financial
Policies,  Efficiency and  Growth  Alan  H. Gelb
WPS203  Optimal  Commodity  Taxes  Under
Rationing  Nanak  Kakwani  June  1989  M. Felix
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WPS204  The  Impact  of Labor  Costs  on
Manufactured  Exports  in  Developing
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on Student  Achievement  and Attitudes
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Marlaine  E. Lockheed  33640
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Teaching  in  the  Philippines  Marlaine  E.  Lockheed  May  1989  C. Cristobal
Josefina  Fonacier  33640
Leonard  J.  Bianchi
WPS209  Can  the  Industrial  Countries




Economic  Analysis and
Prospects  Division
WPS210  Notes  on Cash-Flow  Taxation  Roger  H. Gordon  June  1989  A. Bhalla
60359
WPS211  Coffee  Pricing  Policies  in the
Dominican  Republic  Panos  Varangis  May 1989  D. Gustafson
33714
WPS212  Beyond  the Debt  Crisis:  Alternative
Forms  of Financing  Lessard
WPS213  Conditionality  and  Debt  Relief  Stijn Claessens  June  1989  S. King-Watson
Ishac  Diwan  33730
WPS214  Adjustment  and  the Labor  Market  Peter  R.  Fallon  June  1989  R.  Luz
Luis  A. Riveros  61762
WPS215  Adjustment  and  Income  Distribution:
A  Counterfactual  Analysis  Francois  Bourguignon
William  H. Branson
Jaime  de Melo  May 1989  M. Ameal
61466PPR  Working Paver  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for oapter
WPS216  Price  and  Quality Effects  of
Vers--Revisited:  A Case  Stucly of
Korean  Footwear  Exports  Jaime  de Melo  June  1989  M. Ameal
L. Alan Winters  61466
WPS217  Public  Debt,  North  and  South  Helmut  Reisen
WPS218  Public  Finance,  Trade  and
Development  Vittorio  Corbo
WPS219  Rural  Credit  in Developing  Countries  Avishay Braverman  June  1989  C.  Spooner
J.  Luis  Guasch  37570
WPS220  Capacity  Building  for  Policy Analysis:
Lessons  of Experience  Samuel  Paul
David Steedman
Francis  X. Sutton
WPS221  How  Does Uncertainty  About  the  Real
Exchange Rate  Affect  Exports?  Ricardo  J.  Caballero  June  1989  A.  Oropesa
Vittorio  Corbo  61758
WPS222  Why Stabilisation  Policies  in  Zambia
Did  Not  Succeed  Christopher  Colclough
WPS223  Overvalued  and  Undervalued  Exchange
Rates  in An  Equilibrium  Optimizing
Model  Jose  Saul  Lizondo
WPS224  The  Economics  of the  Government
Budget  Constraint  Stanley  Fischer  May 1989  S. Fischer
33774
WPS225  Targeting  Assistance  to  the  Poor
Using Household  Survey Data  Paul  Glewwe  June  1989  B.  Rosa
Oussama  Kanaan  33751
WPS226  Inflation  and the  Costs of
Stabilization:  Country  Experiences,
Conceptual  Issues, and Policy Lessons  Andres  Solimano  July  1989  E.  Khine
61763
WPS227  Institutional  Reforms  in  Sector
Adjustment  Operations  Samuel Paul  July  1989  E.  Madrona
61712
WPS228  Recent  Economic  Performance  of
Developing  Countries  Robert  Lynn  July  1989  M.  Divino
F. Desmond  McCarthy  33739